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Abstract
Recent progress in artificial intelligence (AI) has renewed interest in building systems that
learn and think like people. Many advances have come from using deep neural networks trained
end-to-end in tasks such as object recognition, video games, and board games, achieving perfor-
mance that equals or even beats humans in some respects. Despite their biological inspiration
and performance achievements, these systems differ from human intelligence in crucial ways.
We review progress in cognitive science suggesting that truly human-like learning and thinking
machines will have to reach beyond current engineering trends in both what they learn, and how
they learn it. Specifically, we argue that these machines should (a) build causal models of the
world that support explanation and understanding, rather than merely solving pattern recog-
nition problems; (b) ground learning in intuitive theories of physics and psychology, to support
and enrich the knowledge that is learned; and (c) harness compositionality and learning-to-learn
to rapidly acquire and generalize knowledge to new tasks and situations. We suggest concrete
challenges and promising routes towards these goals that can combine the strengths of recent
neural network advances with more structured cognitive models.
1 Introduction
Artificial intelligence (AI) has been a story of booms and busts, yet by any traditional measure
of success, the last few years have been marked by exceptional progress. Much of this progress
has come from recent advances in “deep learning,” characterized by learning large neural-network-
style models with multiple layers of representation. These models have achieved remarkable gains
in many domains spanning object recognition, speech recognition, and control (LeCun, Bengio, &
Hinton, 2015; Schmidhuber, 2015). In object recognition, Krizhevsky, Sutskever, and Hinton (2012)
trained a deep convolutional neural network (convnets; LeCun et al., 1989) that nearly halved the
error rate of the previous state-of-the-art on the most challenging benchmark to date. In the years
since, convnets continue to dominate, recently approaching human-level performance on some object
recognition benchmarks (He, Zhang, Ren, & Sun, 2015; Russakovsky et al., 2015; Szegedy et al.,
2014). In automatic speech recognition, Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) have been the leading
approach since the late 1980s (Juang & Rabiner, 1990), yet this framework has been chipped away
piece by piece and replaced with deep learning components (Hinton et al., 2012). Now, the leading
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approaches to speech recognition are fully neural network systems (Graves, Mohamed, & Hinton,
2013; Weng, Yu, Watanabe, & Juang, 2014). Ideas from deep learning have also been applied to
learning complex control problems. V. Mnih et al. (2015) combined ideas from deep learning and
reinforcement learning to make a “deep reinforcement learning” algorithm that learns to play large
classes of simple video games from just frames of pixels and the game score, achieving human or
superhuman level performance on many of these games (see also Guo, Singh, Lee, Lewis, & Wang,
2014; Schaul, Quan, Antonoglou, & Silver, 2015; Stadie, Levine, & Abbeel, 2016).
These accomplishments have helped neural networks regain their status as a leading paradigm in
machine learning, much as they were in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The recent success of
neural networks has captured attention beyond academia. In industry, companies such as Google
and Facebook have active research divisions exploring these technologies, and object and speech
recognition systems based on deep learning have been deployed in core products on smart phones
and the web. The media has also covered many of the recent achievements of neural networks,
often expressing the view that neural networks have achieved this recent success by virtue of their
brain-like computation and thus their ability to emulate human learning and human cognition.
In this article, we view this excitement as an opportunity to examine what it means for a machine
to learn or think like a person. We first review some of the criteria previously offered by cognitive
scientists, developmental psychologists, and AI researchers. Second, we articulate what we view as
the essential ingredients for building such a machine that learns or thinks like a person, synthesizing
theoretical ideas and experimental data from research in cognitive science. Third, we consider
contemporary AI (and deep learning in particular) in light of these ingredients, finding that deep
learning models have yet to incorporate many of them and so may be solving some problems in
different ways than people do. We end by discussing what we view as the most plausible paths
towards building machines that learn and think like people.
Beyond the specific ingredients in our proposal, we draw a broader distinction between two different
computational approaches to intelligence. The statistical pattern recognition approach, embodied by
many deep learning algorithms trained on classification tasks, treats patterns in data as the primary
objects of thought. In this view, learning is the process of discovering these patterns, often through
many layers of feature extraction, whereby recognition and classification are operationalized as
pattern recognition. The alternative approach treats models of the world as primary, where learning
is the process of model-building. Cognition and thought is about using these models to understand
the world, explain what we see, imagine what could have happened that didn’t, what could be true
that isn’t, and then planning actions to make it so. The difference between pattern recognition and
model-building, between prediction and explanation, is central to our view of human intelligence.
Just as scientists seek to explain nature, not simply predict it, we see human intelligence as a
model-building activity. We elaborate this key point with numerous examples below.
Before proceeding, we provide a few caveats about the goals of this article and a brief overview of
the key ideas.
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Table 1: Glossary
Neural network: A network of simple neuron-like processing units that collectively per-
form complex computations. Neural networks are often organized into layers, including an
input layer that presents the data (e.g, an image), hidden layers that transform the data
into intermediate representations, and an output layer that produces a response (e.g., a
label or an action). Recurrent connections are also popular when processing sequential
data.
Deep learning: A neural network with at least one hidden layer (some networks have
dozens). Most state-of-the-art deep networks are trained using the backpropagation algo-
rithm to gradually adjust their connection strengths.
Backpropagation: Gradient descent applied to training a deep neural network. The
gradient of the objective function (e.g., classification error or log-likelihood) with respect
to the model parameters (e.g., connection weights) is used to make a series of small
adjustments to the parameters in a direction that improves the objective function.
Convolutional network (convnet): A neural network that uses trainable filters instead
of (or in addition to) fully-connected layers with independent weights. The same filter is
applied at many locations across an image (or across a time series), leading to neural
networks that are effectively larger but with local connectivity and fewer free parameters.
Model-free and model-based reinforcement learning: Model-free algorithms di-
rectly learn a control policy without explicitly building a model of the environment (re-
ward and state transition distributions). Model-based algorithms learn a model of the
environment and use it to select actions by planning.
Deep Q-learning: A model-free reinforcement learning algorithm used to train deep
neural networks on control tasks such as playing Atari games. A network is trained to
approximate the optimal action-value function Q(s, a), which is the expected long-term
cumulative reward of taking action a in state s and then optimally selecting future actions.
Generative model: A model that specifies a probability distribution over the data. For
instance, in a classification task with examples X and class labels y, a generative model
specifies the distribution of data given labels P (X|y), as well as a prior on labels P (y),
which can be used for sampling new examples or for classification by using Bayes’ rule to
compute P (y|X). A discriminative model specifies P (y|X) directly, possibly by using a
neural network to predict the label for a given data point, and cannot directly be used to
sample new examples or to compute other queries regarding the data. We will generally
be concerned with directed generative models (such as Bayesian networks or probabilistic
programs) which can be given a causal interpretation, although undirected (non-causal)
generative models (such as Boltzmann machines) are also possible.
Program induction: Constructing a program that computes some desired function,
where that function is typically specified by training data consisting of example input-
output pairs. In the case of probabilistic programs, which specify candidate generative
models for data, an abstract description language is used to define a set of allowable
programs and learning is a search for the programs likely to have generated the data.
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1.1 What this article is not
For nearly as long as there have been neural networks, there have been critiques of neural networks
(Crick, 1989; Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988; Marcus, 1998, 2001; Minsky & Papert, 1969; Pinker &
Prince, 1988). While we are critical of neural networks in this article, our goal is to build on
their successes rather than dwell on their shortcomings. We see a role for neural networks in
developing more human-like learning machines: They have been applied in compelling ways to
many types of machine learning problems, demonstrating the power of gradient-based learning and
deep hierarchies of latent variables. Neural networks also have a rich history as computational
models of cognition (D. E. Rumelhart, McClelland, & the PDP research Group, 1986) – a history
we describe in more detail in the next section. At a more fundamental level, any computational
model of learning must ultimately be grounded in the brain’s biological neural networks.
We also believe that future generations of neural networks will look very different from the current
state-of-the-art. They may be endowed with intuitive physics, theory of mind, causal reasoning,
and other capacities we describe in the sections that follow. More structure and inductive biases
could be built into the networks or learned from previous experience with related tasks, leading to
more human-like patterns of learning and development. Networks may learn to effectively search
for and discover new mental models or intuitive theories, and these improved models will, in turn,
enable subsequent learning, allowing systems that learn-to-learn – using previous knowledge to
make richer inferences from very small amounts of training data.
It is also important to draw a distinction between AI that purports to emulate or draw inspiration
from aspects of human cognition, and AI that does not. This article focuses on the former. The
latter is a perfectly reasonable and useful approach to developing AI algorithms – avoiding cogni-
tive or neural inspiration as well as claims of cognitive or neural plausibility. Indeed, this is how
many researchers have proceeded, and this article has little pertinence to work conducted under
this research strategy.1 On the other hand, we believe that reverse engineering human intelligence
can usefully inform AI and machine learning (and has already done so). Across broad swaths of
cognition, people are still far better learners and thinkers than machines. Despite recent computa-
tional achievements, people are better than machines at solving a range of difficult computational
problems, including concept learning, object recognition, speech recognition, scene understanding,
language acquisition, etc. Other human cognitive abilities remain difficult to understand compu-
tationally, including creativity, common sense, and general purpose reasoning. As long as natural
intelligence remains the best example of intelligence, we believe that the project of reverse engineer-
ing the human solutions to difficult computational problems will continue to inform and advance
AI.
Finally, while we focus on neural network approaches to AI, we do not wish to give the impression
that these are the only contributors to recent advances in AI. On the contrary, some of the most
exciting recent progress has been in new forms of probabilistic machine learning (Ghahramani,
2015). For example, researchers have developed automated statistical reasoning techniques (Lloyd,
Duvenaud, Grosse, Tenenbaum, & Ghahramani, 2014), automated techniques for model building
1In their influential textbook, Russell and Norvig (2003) state that “The quest for ‘artificial flight’ succeeded
when the Wright brothers and others stopped imitating birds and started using wind tunnels and learning about
aerodynamics.” (p. 3).
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and selection (Grosse, Salakhutdinov, Freeman, & Tenenbaum, 2012), and probabilistic program-
ming languages (e.g., A. Gelman, Lee, & Guo, 2015; Goodman, Mansinghka, Roy, Bonawitz, &
Tenenbaum, 2008; Mansinghka, Selsam, & Perov, 2014). We believe that these approaches will
play important roles in future AI systems, and they are at least as compatible with the ideas from
cognitive science we discuss here, but a full discussion of those connections is beyond the scope of
the current article.
1.2 Overview of the key ideas
The central goal of this paper is to propose a set of core ingredients for building more human-like
learning and thinking machines. We will elaborate on each of these ingredients and topics in Section
4, but here we briefly overview the key ideas.
The first set of ingredients focuses on developmental “start-up software,” or cognitive capabilities
present early in development. There are several reasons for this focus on development. If an
ingredient is present early in development, it is certainly active and available well before a child or
adult would attempt to learn the types of tasks discussed in this paper. This is true regardless of
whether the early-present ingredient is itself learned from experience or innately present. Also, the
earlier an ingredient is present, the more likely it is to be foundational to later development and
learning.
We focus on two pieces of developmental start-up software. First is intuitive physics: Infants have
primitive object concepts that allow them to track objects over time and allow them to discount
physically implausible trajectories. For example, infants know that objects will persist over time
and that they are solid and coherent. People learn far more quickly and make more accurate
predictions by not having to re-learn these principles for every new task. A second type of software
present in early development is intuitive psychology: Infants understand that other people have
mental states like goals and beliefs, and this understanding strongly constrains their learning and
predictions. A child watching someone play a new video game can infer that the avatar has agency
and is trying to seek reward while avoiding punishment. This inference immediately constrains
other inferences, allowing the child to infer what objects are good and what objects are bad. These
types of inferences further accelerate the learning of new tasks.
Our second set of ingredients focus on learning. We view learning as a form of model building, or
explaining observed data through the construction of causal models of the world. Importantly, the
core capacities for intuitive physics and psychology that young children start with are also causal
models of the world. A primary job of learning is to extend and enrich these models, and to build
analogous causally structured intuitive theories of other domains that evolution might not have
equipped us specifically to reason about.
Compared to state-of-the-art algorithms in machine learning, human learning is distinguished by its
richness and its efficiency. Children come with the ability and the desire to uncover the underlying
causes of sparsely observed events and to use that knowledge to go far beyond the paucity of the
data. It might seem paradoxical that people are capable of learning these richly structured models
from very limited amounts of experience. Unlike typical neural networks, these representations
are often symbolic and relational, which means that the brain is unlikely to take advantage solely
5
of gradient-based learning techniques — it has to grapple with the combinatorial complexity of
model building and theory learning. We suggest that compositionality and learning-to-learn
are ingredients that make this type of rapid model learning possible.
A final set of ingredients concerns how the rich models our minds build are put into action, in
real time. It is remarkable how fast we are to see and to act. People can perceive a novel scene
or spoken utterance in a fraction of a second, in what is surely a mostly feedforward process.
One of the main motivations for using neural networks in machine vision and speech systems is
to respond as quickly as the brain does. Although neural networks are usually aiming at pattern
recognition rather than model-building, we will discuss ways in which these “model-free” methods
can accelerate otherwise-slow model-based inferences in perception and cognition, by learning to
recognize patterns in these inferences, and then predicting the outputs of inference without having
to go through costly intermediate steps. Integrating neural networks that “learn to do inference”
with rich model-building learning mechanisms offers a promising way to explain how human minds
can understand the world so well, so quickly.
We will also discuss the integration of model-based and model-free methods in reinforcement learn-
ing, an area that has seen rapid recent progress. Once a causal model of a task has been learned,
humans can use the model to plan action sequences that maximize future reward; when rewards are
used as the metric for successs in model-building, this is known as model-based reinforcement learn-
ing. However, planning in complex models is cumbersome and slow, making the speed-accuracy
trade-off unfavorable for real-time control. By contrast, model-free reinforcement learning algo-
rithms, such as current instantiations of deep reinforcement learning, support fast control but
at the cost of inflexibility and possibly accuracy. We will review evidence that humans combine
model-based and model-free learning algorithms both competitively and cooperatively, and that
these interactions are supervised by metacognitive processes. The sophistication of human-like
reinforcement learning has yet to be realized in AI systems, but this is an area where crosstalk
between cognitive and engineering approaches is especially promising.
2 Cognitive and neural inspiration in artificial intelligence
The questions of whether and how AI should relate to human cognitive psychology are older than
the terms ‘artificial intelligence’ and ‘cognitive psychology.’ Alan Turing suspected that it is easier
to build and educate a child-machine than try to fully capture adult human cognition (Turing,
1950). Turing pictured the child’s mind as a notebook with “rather little mechanism and lots of
blank sheets,” and the mind of a child-machine as filling in the notebook by responding to rewards
and punishments, similar to reinforcement learning. This view on representation and learning
echoes behaviorism, a dominant psychological tradition in Turing’s time. It also echoes the strong
empiricism of modern connectionist models, the idea that we can learn almost everything we know
from the statistical patterns of sensory inputs.
Cognitive science repudiated the over-simplified behaviorist view and came to play a central role
in early AI research (Boden, 2006). Newell and Simon (1961) developed their “General Problem
Solver” as both an AI algorithm and a model of human problem solving, which they subsequently
tested experimentally (Newell & Simon, 1972). AI pioneers in other areas of research explicitly
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referenced human cognition, and even published papers in cognitive psychology journals (e.g.,
Bobrow & Winograd, 1977; Hayes-Roth & Hayes-Roth, 1979; Winograd, 1972). For example,
Schank (1972), writing in the journal Cognitive Psychology, declared that
We hope to be able to build a program that can learn, as a child does, how to do what
we have described in this paper instead of being spoon-fed the tremendous information
necessary.
A similar sentiment was expressed by Minsky (1974):
I draw no boundary between a theory of human thinking and a scheme for making an
intelligent machine; no purpose would be served by separating these today since neither
domain has theories good enough to explain—or to produce—enough mental capacity.
Much of this research assumed that human knowledge representation is symbolic and that reason-
ing, language, planning and vision could be understood in terms of symbolic operations. Parallel
to these developments, a radically different approach was being explored, based on neuron-like
“sub-symbolic” computations (e.g., Fukushima, 1980; Grossberg, 1976; Rosenblatt, 1958). The
representations and algorithms used by this approach were more directly inspired by neuroscience
than by cognitive psychology, although ultimately it would flower into an influential school of
thought about the nature of cognition—parallel distributed processing (PDP) (D. E. Rumelhart
et al., 1986). As its name suggests, PDP emphasizes parallel computation by combining simple
units to collectively implement sophisticated computations. The knowledge learned by these neural
networks is thus distributed across the collection of units rather than localized as in most symbolic
data structures. The resurgence of recent interest in neural networks, more commonly referred to
as “deep learning,” share the same representational commitments and often even the same learning
algorithms as the earlier PDP models. “Deep” refers to the fact that more powerful models can be
built by composing many layers of representation (see LeCun et al., 2015; Schmidhuber, 2015, for
recent reviews), still very much in the PDP style while utilizing recent advances in hardware and
computing capabilities, as well as massive datasets, to learn deeper models.
It is also important to clarify that the PDP perspective is compatible with “model building” in
addition to “pattern recognition.” Some of the original work done under the banner of PDP
(D. E. Rumelhart et al., 1986) is closer to model building than pattern recognition, whereas the
recent large-scale discriminative deep learning systems more purely exemplify pattern recognition
(but see Bottou, 2014). But, as discussed, there is also a question of the nature of the learned
representations within the model – their form, compositionality, and transferability – and the
developmental start-up software that was used to get there. We focus on these issues in this paper.
Neural network models and the PDP approach offer a view of the mind (and intelligence more
broadly) that is sub-symbolic and often populated with minimal constraints and inductive biases
to guide learning. Proponents of this approach maintain that many classic types of structured
knowledge, such as graphs, grammars, rules, objects, structural descriptions, programs, etc. can be
useful yet misleading metaphors for characterizing thought. These structures are more epiphenom-
enal than real, emergent properties of more fundamental sub-symbolic cognitive processes (McClel-
land et al., 2010). Compared to other paradigms for studying cognition, this position on the nature
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of representation is often accompanied by a relatively “blank slate” vision of initial knowledge and
representation, much like Turing’s blank notebook.
When attempting to understand a particular cognitive ability or phenomenon within this paradigm,
a common scientific strategy is to train a relatively generic neural network to perform the task,
adding additional ingredients only when necessary. This approach has shown that neural networks
can behave as if they learned explicitly structured knowledge, such as a rule for producing the past
tense of words (D. E. Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986), rules for solving simple balance-beam physics
problems (McClelland, 1988), or a tree to represent types of living things (plants and animals) and
their distribution of properties (Rogers & McClelland, 2004). Training large-scale relatively generic
networks is also the best current approach for object recognition (He et al., 2015; Krizhevsky et al.,
2012; Russakovsky et al., 2015; Szegedy et al., 2014), where the high-level feature representations
of these convolutional nets have also been used to predict patterns of neural response in human and
macaque IT cortex (Khaligh-Razavi & Kriegeskorte, 2014; Kriegeskorte, 2015; Yamins et al., 2014)
and human typicality ratings for images of common objects (Lake, Zaremba, Fergus, & Gureckis,
2015). Moreover, researchers have trained generic networks to perform structured and even strategic
tasks, such as the recent work on using a Deep Q-learning Network (DQN) to play simple video
games (V. Mnih et al., 2015). If neural networks have such broad application in machine vision,
language, and control, and if they can be trained to emulate the rule-like and structured behaviors
that characterize cognition, do we need more to develop truly human-like learning and thinking
machines? How far can relatively generic neural networks bring us towards this goal?
3 Challenges for building more human-like machines
While cognitive science has not yet converged on a single account of the mind or intelligence, the
claim that a mind is a collection of general purpose neural networks with few initial constraints is
rather extreme in contemporary cognitive science. A different picture has emerged that highlights
the importance of early inductive biases, including core concepts such as number, space, agency and
objects, as well as powerful learning algorithms that rely on prior knowledge to extract knowledge
from small amounts of training data. This knowledge is often richly organized and theory-like
in structure, capable of the graded inferences and productive capacities characteristic of human
thought.
Here we present two challenge problems for machine learning and AI: learning simple visual concepts
(Lake, Salakhutdinov, & Tenenbaum, 2015) and learning to play the Atari game Frostbite (V. Mnih
et al., 2015). We also use the problems as running examples to illustrate the importance of core
cognitive ingredients in the sections that follow.
3.1 The Characters Challenge
The first challenge concerns handwritten character recognition, a classic problem for comparing
different types of machine learning algorithms. Hofstadter (1985) argued that the problem of
recognizing characters in all the ways people do contains most if not all of the fundamental challenges
of AI. More practically, the task requires machines to solve a real world problem that children and
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Figure 1: The characters challenge: human-level learning of a novel handwritten characters (A),
with the same abilities also illustrated for a novel two-wheeled vehicle (B). A single example of a
new visual concept (red box) can be enough information to support the (i) classification of new
examples, (ii) generation of new examples, (iii) parsing an object into parts and relations, and (iv)
generation of new concepts from related concepts. Figure reprinted from Lake, Salakhutdinov, and
Tenenbaum (2015).
adults also learn to solve, and it has important practical applications such as reading envelope
addresses or checks in an ATM machine. Handwritten character recognition is also simpler than
more general forms of object recognition – the object of interest is two-dimensional, separated from
the background, and usually unoccluded. Compared to how people learn and see other types of
objects, it seems possible, in the near term, to build algorithms that can see most of the structure
in characters that people can see.
The standard benchmark is the MNIST data set for digit recognition, which involves classifying
images of digits into the categories ‘0’-‘9’ (LeCun, Bottou, Bengio, & Haffner, 1998). The training
set provides 6,000 images per class for a total of 60,000 training images. With a large amount
of training data available, many algorithms achieve respectable performance, including K-nearest
neighbors (5% test error), support vector machines (about 1% test error), and convolutional neural
networks (below 1% test error; LeCun et al., 1998). The best results achieved using deep convolu-
tional nets are very close to human-level performance at an error rate of 0.2% (Ciresan, Meier, &
Schmidhuber, 2012). Similarly, recent results applying convolutional nets to the far more challeng-
ing ImageNet object recognition benchmark have shown that human-level performance is within
reach on that data set as well (Russakovsky et al., 2015).
While humans and neural networks may perform equally well on the MNIST digit recognition task
and other large-scale image classification tasks, it does not mean that they learn and think in the
same way. There are at least two important differences: people learn from fewer examples and
they learn richer representations, a comparison true for both learning handwritten characters as
well as learning more general classes of objects (Figure 1). People can learn to recognize a new
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handwritten character from a single example (Figure 1A-i), allowing them to discriminate between
novel instances drawn by other people and similar looking non-instances (Lake, Salakhutdinov, &
Tenenbaum, 2015; Miller, Matsakis, & Viola, 2000). Moreover, people learn more than how to do
pattern recognition: they learn a concept – that is, a model of the class that allows their acquired
knowledge to be flexibly applied in new ways. In addition to recognizing new examples, people
can also generate new examples (Figure 1A-ii), parse a character into its most important parts and
relations (Figure 1A-iii; Lake, Salakhutdinov, and Tenenbaum (2012)), and generate new characters
given a small set of related characters (Figure 1A-iv). These additional abilities come for free along
with the acquisition of the underlying concept.
Even for these simple visual concepts, people are still better and more sophisticated learners than
the best algorithms for character recognition. People learn a lot more from a lot less, and cap-
turing these human-level learning abilities in machines is the Characters Challenge. We recently
reported progress on this challenge using probabilistic program induction (Lake, Salakhutdinov,
& Tenenbaum, 2015), yet aspects of the full human cognitive ability remain out of reach. While
both people and model represent characters as a sequence of pen strokes and relations, people have
a far richer repertoire of structural relations between strokes. Furthermore, people can efficiently
integrate across multiple examples of a character to infer which have optional elements, such as
the horizontal cross-bar in ‘7’s, combining different variants of the same character into a single co-
herent representation. Additional progress may come by combining deep learning and probabilistic
program induction to tackle even richer versions of the Characters Challenge.
3.2 The Frostbite Challenge
The second challenge concerns the Atari game Frostbite (Figure 2), which was one of the control
problems tackled by the DQN of V. Mnih et al. (2015). The DQN was a significant advance in
reinforcement learning, showing that a single algorithm can learn to play a wide variety of complex
tasks. The network was trained to play 49 classic Atari games, impressively achieving human-level
performance or above on 29 of the games. It did, however, have particular trouble with Frostbite
and other games that required temporally extended planning strategies.
In Frostbite, players control an agent (Frostbite Bailey) tasked with constructing an igloo within a
time limit. The igloo is built piece-by-piece as the agent jumps on ice floes in water (Figure 2A-C).
The challenge is that the ice floes are in constant motion (moving either left or right), and ice floes
only contribute to the construction of the igloo if they are visited in an active state (white rather
than blue). The agent may also earn extra points by gathering fish while avoiding a number of
fatal hazards (falling in the water, snow geese, polar bears, etc.). Success in this game requires a
temporally extended plan to ensure the agent can accomplish a sub-goal (such as reaching an ice
floe) and then safely proceed to the next sub-goal. Ultimately, once all of the pieces of the igloo
are in place, the agent must proceed to the igloo and thus complete the level before time expires
(Figure 2C).
The DQN learns to play Frostbite and other Atari games by combining a powerful pattern recognizer
(a deep convolutional neural network) and a simple model-free reinforcement learning algorithm
(Q-learning; Watkins & Dayan, 1992). These components allow the network to map sensory inputs
(frames of pixels) onto a policy over a small set of actions, and both the mapping and the policy
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Figure 2: Screenshots of Frostbite, a 1983 video game designed for the Atari game console. A) The
start of a level in Frostbite. The agent must construct an igloo by hopping between ice flows and
avoiding obstacles such as birds. The floes are in constant motion (either left or right), making
multi-step planning essential to success. B) The agent receives pieces of the igloo (top right) by
jumping on the active ice floes (white), which then deactivates them (blue). C) At the end of a
level, the agent must safely reach the completed igloo. D) Later levels include additional rewards
(fish) and deadly obstacles (crabs, clams, and bears).
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are trained to optimize long-term cumulative reward (the game score). The network embodies the
strongly empiricist approach characteristic of most connectionist models: very little is built into
the network apart from the assumptions about image structure inherent in convolutional networks,
so the network has to essentially learn a visual and conceptual system from scratch for each new
game. In V. Mnih et al. (2015), the network architecture and hyper-parameters were fixed, but
the network was trained anew for each game, meaning the visual system and the policy are highly
specialized for the games it was trained on. More recent work has shown how these game-specific
networks can be used to train a multi-task network with a shared visual system, achieving modest
benefits of transfer when learning to play new games (Parisotto, Ba, & Salakhutdinov, 2016).
Although it is interesting that the DQN learns to play games at human-level performance while
assuming very little prior knowledge, the DQN may be learning to play Frostbite and other games
in a very different way than people do. One way to examine the differences is by considering the
amount of experience required for learning. In V. Mnih et al. (2015), the DQN was compared with a
professional gamer who received approximately two hours of practice on each of the 49 Atari games
(although he or she likely had prior experience with some of the games). The DQN was trained on
200 million frames from each of the games, which equates to approximately 924 hours of game time
(about 38 days), or almost 500 times as much experience as the human received.2 Additionally, the
DQN incorporates experience replay, where each of these frames is replayed approximately 8 more
times on average over the course of learning.
With the full 924 hours of unique experience and additional replay, the DQN achieved less than
10% of human-level performance during a controlled test session (see DQN in Fig. 3). More recent
variants of the DQN have demonstrated superior performance (Schaul et al., 2015; Stadie et al.,
2016; van Hasselt, Guez, & Silver, 2016), and the current best network with smarter replay and
other improvements now achieves about 83% of the professional gamer’s score (Schaul et al., 2015)
(see DQN+ in Fig. 3). But it requires a lot of experience to reach this level: performance is
around 46% after 231 hours, 19% after 116 hours, and below 3.5% after just 2 hours (which is close
to random play, approximately 1.5%). The differences between the human and machine learning
curves suggest that they may be learning different kinds of knowledge, using different learning
mechanisms, or both.
The contrast becomes even more dramatic if we look at the very earliest stages of learning. While
both the original DQN and these more recent variants require multiple hours of experience to
perform reliably better than random play, even non-professional humans can grasp the basics
of the game after just a few minutes of play. We speculate that people do this by inferring a
general schema to describe the goals of the game and the object types and their interactions,
using the kinds of intuitive theories, model-building abilities and model-based planning mecha-
nisms we describe below. While novice players may make some mistakes, such as inferring that
fish are harmful rather than helpful, they can learn to play better than chance within a few min-
utes. If humans are able to first watch an expert playing for a few minutes, they can learn even
faster. In informal experiments with two of the authors playing Frostbite on a Javascript emu-
lator (http://www.virtualatari.org/soft.php?soft=Frostbite), after watching videos of expert play
on YouTube for just two minutes, we found that we were able to reach scores comparable to or
2The time required to train the DQN (compute time) is not the same as the game (experience) time. Compute
time can be longer.
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Figure 3: Learning curves for people and Deep Q-Networks (DQNs) on Frostbite. Frostbite score
(during testing) is normalized with respect to the performance of a human professional game tester
who received about two hours of practice (red dot). The DQN (dashed) is from V. Mnih et al.
(2015) and the DQN+ (solid) is from Schaul et al. (2015). Scores were estimated by hand from
Fig. 7 in Schaul et al. (2015), and the model scores at the 2 hours mark are likely an overestimate.
Random play is about 1.5%. The amount of unique experience playing Frostbite, before scoring
test performance, is measured in hours of game time.
better than the human expert reported in V. Mnih et al. (2015) after at most 15-20 minutes of
total practice.3
There are other behavioral signatures that suggest fundamental differences in representation and
learning between people and the DQN. For instance, the game of Frostbite provides incremental
rewards for reaching each ice flow – rewards that are likely essential for guiding learning in the
DQN by providing concrete sub-goals. Otherwise, the DQN would have to take random actions
until it accidentally builds an igloo and is rewarded for completing the entire level. In contrast,
people likely do not need incremental scoring to figure out the game and the importance of the
higher-level goal of building an igloo.
The learned DQN network is also rather inflexible to changes in its inputs and goals: changing
the color or appearance of objects or changing the goals of the network would have devastating
consequences on performance if the network is not retrained. Contrast this with the seemingly
limitless flexibility of human intelligence. For example, imagine playing Frostbite with one of these
3More precisely, the human expert in V. Mnih et al. (2015) scored an average of 4335 points across 30 game
sessions of up to five minutes of play. In individual sessions lasting no longer than five minutes, author TDU obtained
scores of 3520 points after approximately 5 minutes of gameplay, 3510 points after 10 minutes, and 7810 points after
15 minutes. Author JBT obtained 4060 after approximately 5 minutes of gameplay, 4920 after 10-15 minutes, and
6710 after no more than 20 minutes. TDU and JBT each watched approximately two minutes of expert play on
YouTube (e.g., https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZpUFztf9Fjc, but there are many similar examples that can be
found in a YouTube search).
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goals:
• Get the lowest possible score.
• Get closest to 100, or 300, or 1000, or 3000, or any level, without going over.
• Beat your friend, who’s playing next to you, but just barely, not by too much, so as not to
embarrass them.
• Go as long as you can without dying.
• Die as quickly as you can.
• Pass each level at the last possible minute, right before the temperature timer hits zero and
you die (i.e., come as close as you can to dying from frostbite without actually dying).
• Get to the furthest unexplored level without regard for your score.
• See if you can discover secret Easter eggs.
• Get as many fish as you can.
• Touch all the individual ice floes on screen once and only once.
• Teach your friend how to play as efficiently as possible.
This range of goals highlights an essential component of human intelligence: people can learn models
and use them for arbitrary new goals and tasks with little or no retraining or reconfiguration.
The Frostbite example is a particularly telling contrast when compared with human play. Even
the best deep networks learn gradually over many thousands of game episodes, take a long time
to reach good performance and are locked into particular input and goal patterns. Humans, after
playing just a small number of games over a span of minutes, can understand the game and its goals
well enough to perform better than deep networks do after almost a thousand hours of experience
– and even more impressively, understand enough to invent new goals, generalize over changes to
the input, and explain the game to others. Why are people different? What core ingredients of
human intelligence might the DQN and other modern machine learning methods be missing?
4 Core ingredients of human intelligence
In the Introduction, we laid out what we see as the core ingredients of intelligence. Here we consider
the ingredients in detail and contrast them with the current state of neural network modeling.
While these are hardly the only ingredients needed for human-like learning and thought, they are
key building blocks which are not present in most current learning-based AI systems – certainly
not all present together. We believe that integrating them will produce significantly more powerful
and more human-like learning and thinking abilities than we currently see in AI systems.
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4.1 Developmental start-up software
Early in development, humans have a foundational understanding of several core domains (Spelke,
2003; Spelke & Kinzler, 2007). These domains include number (numerical and set operations), space
(geometry and navigation), physics (inanimate objects and mechanics) and psychology (agents and
groups). These core domains cleave cognition at its conceptual joints, and each domain is organized
by a set of entities and abstract principles relating the entities. The underlying cognitive repre-
sentations can be understood as ‘intuitive theories’, with a causal structure resembling a scientific
theory (Carey, 2004, 2009; Gopnik et al., 2004; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1999; Gweon, Tenenbaum, &
Schulz, 2010; L. Schulz, 2012; Wellman & Gelman, 1998). The ‘child as scientist’ proposal further
views the process of learning itself as also scientist-like, with recent experiments showing that chil-
dren seek out new data to distinguish between hypotheses, isolate variables, test causal hypotheses,
make use of the data-generating process in drawing conclusions, and learn selectively from others
(Cook, Goodman, & Schulz, 2011; Gweon et al., 2010; L. E. Schulz, Gopnik, & Glymour, 2007;
Stahl & Feigenson, 2015; Tsividis, Gershman, Tenenbaum, & Schulz, 2013). We will address the
nature of learning mechanisms in Section 4.2.
Each core domain has been the target of a great deal of study and analysis, and together the
domains are thought to be shared cross-culturally and partly with non-human animals. All of these
domains may be important augmentations to current machine learning, though below we focus in
particular on the early understanding of objects and agents.
4.1.1 Intuitive physics
Young children have rich knowledge of intuitive physics. Whether learned or innate, important
physical concepts are present at ages far earlier than when a child or adult learns to play Frostbite,
suggesting these resources may be used for solving this and many everyday physics-related tasks.
At the age of 2 months and possibly earlier, human infants expect inanimate objects to follow
principles of persistence, continuity, cohesion and solidity. Young infants believe objects should
move along smooth paths, not wink in and out of existence, not inter-penetrate and not act at a
distance (Spelke, 1990; Spelke, Gutheil, & Van de Walle, 1995).
These basic expectations guide early reasoning about object boundaries and their motion, and they
guide learning throughout childhood. At around 6 months, infants have already developed different
expectations for rigid bodies, soft bodies and liquids (Rips & Hespos, 2015). Liquids, for example,
are expected to go through barriers, while solid objects cannot (Hespos, Ferry, & Rips, 2009). By
their first birthday, infants have gone through several transitions of comprehending basic physical
concepts such as inertia, support, containment and collisions (Baillargeon, 2004; Baillargeon, Li,
Ng, & Yuan, 2009; Hespos & Baillargeon, 2008).
There is no single agreed-upon computational account of these early physical principles and con-
cepts, and previous suggestions have ranged from decision trees (Baillargeon et al., 2009), to cues,
to lists of rules (Siegler & Chen, 1998). A promising recent approach sees intuitive physical rea-
soning as similar to inference over a physics software engine, the kind of simulators that power
modern-day animations and games (Bates, Yildirim, Tenenbaum, & Battaglia, 2015; Battaglia,
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AB Changes to Input
Add blocks, blocks made of styrofoam, blocks made of lead, blocks made of goo, 
table is made of rubber, table is actually quicksand, pour water on the tower, 
pour honey on the tower, blue blocks are glued together, red blocks are magnetic, 
gravity is reversed, wind blows over table, table has slippery ice on top...  
Figure 4: The intuitive physics-engine approach to scene understanding, illustrated through tower
stability. (A) The engine takes in inputs through perception, language, memory and other faculties.
It then constructs a physical scene with objects, physical properties and forces, simulates the scene’s
development over time and hands the output to other reasoning systems. (B) Many possible
‘tweaks’ to the input can result in much different scenes, requiring the potential discovery, training
and evaluation of new features for each tweak. Adapted from Battaglia et al. (2013).
Hamrick, & Tenenbaum, 2013; Gerstenberg, Goodman, Lagnado, & Tenenbaum, 2015; Sanborn,
Mansinghka, & Griffiths, 2013). According to this hypothesis, people reconstruct a perceptual
scene using internal representations of the objects and their physically relevant properties (such
as mass, elasticity, and surface friction), and forces acting on objects (such as gravity, friction, or
collision impulses). Relative to physical ground truth, the intuitive physical state representation
is approximate and probabilistic, and oversimplified and incomplete in many ways. Still, it is rich
enough to support mental simulations that can predict how objects will move in the immediate
future, either on their own or in responses to forces we might apply.
This “intuitive physics engine” approach enables flexible adaptation to a wide range of everyday
scenarios and judgments in a way that goes beyond perceptual cues. For example (Figure 4), a
physics-engine reconstruction of a tower of wooden blocks from the game Jenga can be used to
predict whether (and how) a tower will fall, finding close quantitative fits to how adults make these
predictions (Battaglia et al., 2013) as well as simpler kinds of physical predictions that have been
studied in infants (Te´gla´s et al., 2011). Simulation-based models can also capture how people make
hypothetical or counterfactual predictions: What would happen if certain blocks are taken away,
more blocks are added, or the table supporting the tower is jostled? What if certain blocks were
glued together, or attached to the table surface? What if the blocks were made of different materials
(Styrofoam, lead, ice)? What if the blocks of one color were much heavier than other colors? Each
of these physical judgments may require new features or new training for a pattern-recognition
account to work at the same level as the model-based simulator.
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What are the prospects for embedding or acquiring this kind of intuitive physics in deep learning
systems? Connectionist models in psychology have previously been applied to physical reasoning
tasks such as balance-beam rules (McClelland, 1988; Shultz, 2003) or rules relating distance, veloc-
ity, and time in motion (Buckingham & Shultz, 2000), but these networks do not attempt to work
with complex scenes as input or a wide range of scenarios and judgments as in Figure 4. A recent
paper from Facebook AI researchers (Lerer, Gross, & Fergus, 2016) represents an exciting step in
this direction. Lerer et al. (2016) trained a deep convolutional network-based system (PhysNet)
to predict the stability of block towers from simulated images similar to those in Figure 4A but
with much simpler configurations of two, three or four cubical blocks stacked vertically. Impres-
sively, PhysNet generalized to simple real images of block towers, matching human performance
on these images, meanwhile exceeding human performance on synthetic images. Human and Phys-
Net confidence were also correlated across towers, although not as strongly as for the approximate
probabilistic simulation models and experiments of Battaglia et al. (2013). One limitation is that
PhysNet currently requires extensive training – between 100,000 and 200,000 scenes – to learn
judgments for just a single task (will the tower fall?) on a narrow range of scenes (towers with two
to four cubes). It has been shown to generalize, but also only in limited ways (e.g., from towers
of two and three cubes to towers of four cubes). In contrast, people require far less experience
to perform any particular task, and can generalize to many novel judgments and complex scenes
with no new training required (although they receive large amounts of physics experience through
interacting with the world more generally). Could deep learning systems such as PhysNet cap-
ture this flexibility, without explicitly simulating the causal interactions between objects in three
dimensions? We are not sure, but we hope this is a challenge they will take on.
Alternatively, instead of trying to make predictions without simulating physics, could neural net-
works be trained to emulate a general-purpose physics simulator, given the right type and quantity
of training data, such as the raw input experienced by a child? This is an active and intriguing area
of research, but it too faces significant challenges. For networks trained on object classification,
deeper layers often become sensitive to successively higher-level features, from edges to textures
to shape-parts to full objects (Yosinski, Clune, Bengio, & Lipson, 2014; Zeiler & Fergus, 2014).
For deep networks trained on physics-related data, it remains to be seen whether higher layers
will encode objects, general physical properties, forces and approximately Newtonian dynamics. A
generic network trained on dynamic pixel data might learn an implicit representation of these con-
cepts, but would it generalize broadly beyond training contexts as people’s more explicit physical
concepts do? Consider for example a network that learns to predict the trajectories of several balls
bouncing in a box (Kodratoff & Michalski, 2014). If this network has actually learned something
like Newtonian mechanics, then it should be able to generalize to interestingly different scenarios –
at a minimum different numbers of differently shaped objects, bouncing in boxes of different shapes
and sizes and orientations with respect to gravity, not to mention more severe generalization tests
such as all of the tower tasks discussed above, which also fall under the Newtonian domain. Neural
network researchers have yet to take on this challenge, but we hope they will. Whether such models
can be learned with the kind (and quantity) of data available to human infants is not clear, as we
discuss further in Section 5.
It may be difficult to integrate object and physics-based primitives into deep neural networks, but
the payoff in terms of learning speed and performance could be great for many tasks. Consider the
case of learning to play Frostbite. Although it can be difficult to discern exactly how a network
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learns to solve a particular task, the DQN probably does not parse a Frostbite screenshot in terms
of stable objects or sprites moving according to the rules of intuitive physics (Figure 2). But
incorporating a physics-engine-based representation could help DQNs learn to play games such as
Frostbite in a faster and more general way, whether the physics knowledge is captured implicitly in
a neural network or more explicitly in simulator. Beyond reducing the amount of training data and
potentially improving the level of performance reached by the DQN, it could eliminate the need to
retrain a Frostbite network if the objects (e.g., birds, ice-floes and fish) are slightly altered in their
behavior, reward-structure, or appearance. When a new object type such as a bear is introduced,
as in the later levels of Frostbite (Figure 2D), a network endowed with intuitive physics would also
have an easier time adding this object type to its knowledge (the challenge of adding new objects
was also discussed in Marcus, 1998). In this way, the integration of intuitive physics and deep
learning could be an important step towards more human-like learning algorithms.
4.1.2 Intuitive psychology
Intuitive psychology is another early-emerging ability with an important influence on human learn-
ing and thought. Pre-verbal infants distinguish animate agents from inanimate objects. This
distinction is partially based on innate or early-present detectors for low-level cues, such as the
presence of eyes, motion initiated from rest, and biological motion (Johnson, Slaughter, & Carey,
1998; Premack & Premack, 1997; Schlottmann, Ray, Mitchell, & Demetriou, 2006; Tremoulet &
Feldman, 2000). Such cues are often sufficient but not necessary for the detection of agency.
Beyond these low-level cues, infants also expect agents to act contingently and reciprocally, to have
goals, and to take efficient actions towards those goals subject to constraints (Csibra, 2008; Csibra,
B´ıro´, Koo´s, & Gergely, 2003; Spelke & Kinzler, 2007). These goals can be socially directed; at
around three months of age, infants begin to discriminate anti-social agents that hurt or hinder
others from neutral agents (Hamlin, 2013; Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2010), and they later distin-
guish between anti-social, neutral, and pro-social agents (Hamlin, Ullman, Tenenbaum, Goodman,
& Baker, 2013; Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007).
It is generally agreed that infants expect agents to act in a goal-directed, efficient, and socially
sensitive fashion (Spelke & Kinzler, 2007). What is less agreed on is the computational architecture
that supports this reasoning and whether it includes any reference to mental states and explicit
goals.
One possibility is that intuitive psychology is simply cues “all the way down” (Schlottmann, Cole,
Watts, & White, 2013; Scholl & Gao, 2013), though this would require more and more cues as the
scenarios become more complex. Consider for example a scenario in which an agent A is moving
towards a box, and an agent B moves in a way that blocks A from reaching the box. Infants and
adults are likely to interpret B’s behavior as ‘hindering’ (Hamlin, 2013). This inference could be
captured by a cue that states ‘if an agent’s expected trajectory is prevented from completion, the
blocking agent is given some negative association.’
While the cue is easily calculated, the scenario is also easily changed to necessitate a different type of
cue. Suppose A was already negatively associated (a ‘bad guy’); acting negatively towards A could
then be seen as good (Hamlin, 2013). Or suppose something harmful was in the box which A didn’t
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know about. Now B would be seen as helping, protecting, or defending A. Suppose A knew there
was something bad in the box and wanted it anyway. B could be seen as acting paternalistically.
A cue-based account would be twisted into gnarled combinations such as ‘If an expected trajectory
is prevented from completion, the blocking agent is given some negative association, unless that
trajectory leads to a negative outcome or the blocking agent is previously associated as positive,
or the blocked agent is previously associated as negative, or...’
An alternative to a cue-based account is to use generative models of action choice, as in the Bayesian
inverse planning (or “Bayesian theory-of-mind”) models of Baker, Saxe, and Tenenbaum (2009)
or the “naive utility calculus” models of Jara-Ettinger, Gweon, Tenenbaum, and Schulz (2015).
These models formalize explicitly mentalistic concepts such as ‘goal,’ ‘agent,’ ‘planning,’ ‘cost,’
‘efficiency,’ and ‘belief,’ used to describe core psychological reasoning in infancy. They assume
adults and children treat agents as approximately rational planners who choose the most efficient
means to their goals. Planning computations may be formalized as solutions to Markov Decision
Processes (or POMDPs), taking as input utility and belief functions defined over an agent’s state-
space and the agent’s state-action transition functions, and returning a series of actions the agent
should perform to most efficiently fulfill their goals (or maximize their utility). By simulating these
planning processes, people can predict what agents might do next, or use inverse reasoning from
observing a series of actions to infer the utilities and beliefs of agents in a scene. This is directly
analogous to how simulation engines can be used for intuitive physics, to predict what will happen
next in a scene or to infer objects’ dynamical properties from how they move. It yields similarly
flexible reasoning abilities: Utilities and beliefs can be adjusted to take into account how agents
might act for a wide range of novel goals and situations. Importantly, unlike in intuitive physics,
simulation-based reasoning in intuitive psychology can be nested recursively to understand social
interactions – we can think about agents thinking about other agents.
As in the case of intuitive physics, the success that generic deep networks will have in capturing intu-
itive psychological reasoning will depend in part on the representations humans use. Although deep
networks have not yet been applied to scenarios involving theory-of-mind and intuitive psychology,
they could probably learn visual cues, heuristics and summary statistics of a scene that happens
to involve agents.4 If that is all that underlies human psychological reasoning, a data-driven deep
learning approach can likely find success in this domain.
However, it seems to us that any full formal account of intuitive psychological reasoning needs to
include representations of agency, goals, efficiency, and reciprocal relations. As with objects and
forces, it is unclear whether a complete representation of these concepts (agents, goals, etc.) could
emerge from deep neural networks trained in a purely predictive capacity. Similar to the intuitive
physics domain, it is possible that with a tremendous number of training trajectories in a variety of
scenarios, deep learning techniques could approximate the reasoning found in infancy even without
learning anything about goal-directed or social-directed behavior more generally. But this is also
unlikely to resemble how humans learn, understand, and apply intuitive psychology unless the
concepts are genuine. In the same way that altering the setting of a scene or the target of inference
in a physics-related task may be difficult to generalize without an understanding of objects, altering
4While connectionist networks have been used to model the general transition that children undergo between the
ages of 3 and 4 regarding false belief (e.g., Berthiaume, Shultz, & Onishi, 2013), we are referring here to scenarios
which require inferring goals, utilities, and relations.
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the setting of an agent or their goals and beliefs is difficult to reason about without understanding
intuitive psychology.
In introducing the Frostbite challenge, we discussed how people can learn to play the game ex-
tremely quickly by watching an experienced player for just a few minutes and then playing a few
rounds themselves. Intuitive psychology provides a basis for efficient learning from others, espe-
cially in teaching settings with the goal of communicating knowledge efficiently (Shafto, Goodman,
& Griffiths, 2014). In the case of watching an expert play Frostbite, whether or not there is an
explicit goal to teach, intuitive psychology lets us infer the beliefs, desires, and intentions of the
experienced player. For instance, we can learn that the birds are to be avoided from seeing how
the experienced player appears to avoid them. We do not need to experience a single example of
encountering a bird – and watching the Frostbite Bailey die because of the bird – in order to infer
that birds are probably dangerous. It is enough to see that the experienced player’s avoidance
behavior is best explained as acting under that belief.
Similarly, consider how a sidekick agent (increasingly popular in video-games) is expected to help a
player achieve their goals. This agent can be useful in different ways under different circumstances,
such as getting items, clearing paths, fighting, defending, healing, and providing information – all
under the general notion of being helpful (Macindoe, 2013). An explicit agent representation can
predict how such an agent will be helpful in new circumstances, while a bottom-up pixel-based
representation is likely to struggle.
There are several ways that intuitive psychology could be incorporated into contemporary deep
learning systems. While it could be built in, intuitive psychology may arise in other ways. Connec-
tionists have argued that innate constraints in the form of hard-wired cortical circuits are unlikely
(Elman, 2005; Elman et al., 1996), but a simple inductive bias, for example the tendency to notice
things that move other things, can bootstrap reasoning about more abstract concepts of agency
(S. Ullman, Harari, & Dorfman, 2012).5 Similarly, a great deal of goal-directed and socially-directed
actions can also be boiled down to a simple utility-calculus (e.g., Jara-Ettinger et al., 2015), in a
way that could be shared with other cognitive abilities. While the origins of intuitive psychology
is still a matter of debate, it is clear that these abilities are early-emerging and play an important
role in human learning and thought, as exemplified in the Frostbite challenge and when learning to
play novel video games more broadly.
4.2 Learning as rapid model building
Since their inception, neural networks models have stressed the importance of learning. There
are many learning algorithms for neural networks, including the perceptron algorithm (Rosenblatt,
1958), Hebbian learning (Hebb, 1949), the BCM rule (Bienenstock, Cooper, & Munro, 1982), back-
propagation (D. Rumelhart, Hinton, & Williams, 1986), the wake-sleep algorithm (Hinton, Dayan,
Frey, & Neal, 1995), and contrastive divergence (Hinton, 2002). Whether the goal is supervised
or unsupervised learning, these algorithms implement learning as a process of gradual adjustment
of connection strengths. For supervised learning, the updates are usually aimed at improving the
5We must be careful here about what “simple” means. An inductive bias may appear simple in the sense that
we can compactly describe it, but it may require complex computation (e.g., motion analysis, parsing images into
objects, etc.) just to produce its inputs in a suitable form.
20
algorithm’s pattern recognition capabilities. For unsupervised learning, the updates work towards
gradually matching the statistics of the model’s internal patterns with the statistics of the input
data.
Connectionist learning algorithms have been shown to learn powerful models, yet their local and
incremental nature seems at odds with important aspects of human learning. Many of the most im-
pressive examples of human learning are better characterized as rapid model building than gradual
improvements in pattern recognition. The differences are emphasized by considering the amount
of data required for learning as well as the richness of the acquired knowledge.
Children can make meaningful generalizations from very sparse data, especially in the context of
learning the meanings of words in their native language (Carey & Bartlett, 1978; Landau, Smith,
& Jones, 1988; E. M. Markman, 1989; Smith, Jones, Landau, Gershkoff-Stowe, & Samuelson, 2002;
F. Xu & Tenenbaum, 2007, although see Horst and Samuelson 2008 regarding memory limitations).
Children may only need to see a few examples of the concepts hairbrush, pineapple or lightsaber
before they largely ‘get it,’ grasping the boundary of the infinite set that defines each concept from
the infinite set of all possible objects. Children are far more practiced than adults at learning
new concepts – learning roughly nine or ten new words each day after beginning to speak through
the end of high school (Bloom, 2000; Carey, 1978) – yet the ability for rapid “one-shot” learning
does not disappear in adulthood. An adult may need to see a single image or movie of a novel
two-wheeled vehicle to infer the boundary between this concept and others, allowing him or her
to discriminate new examples of that concept from similar looking objects of a different type (Fig.
1B-i).
Contrasting with the efficiency of human learning, neural networks – by virtue of their generality
as nonparametric function approximators – are notoriously data hungry (Geman, Bienenstock, &
Doursat, 1992). Benchmark tasks such as the ImageNet data set for object recognition provides
hundreds or thousands of examples per class (Krizhevsky et al., 2012; Russakovsky et al., 2015)
– 1000 hairbrushes, 1000 pineapples, etc. In the context of learning new handwritten characters
or learning to play Frostbite, the MNIST benchmark includes 6000 examples of each handwritten
digit (LeCun et al., 1998), and the DQN of V. Mnih et al. (2015) played each Atari video game for
approximately 924 hours of unique training experience (Figure 3). In both cases, the algorithms
are clearly using information less efficiently than a person.
It is also important to mention that there are many classes of concepts that people learn more
slowly. Concepts that are learned in school are usually far more challenging and more difficult
to acquire, including mathematical functions, logarithms, derivatives, integrals, atoms, electrons,
gravity, DNA, evolution, etc. There are also domains that machines are more apt learners than
people, such as combing through financial or weather data. But for the vast majority of cognitively
natural concepts – the types of things that children learn as the meanings of words – people are still
far better learners than machines. This is the type of learning we focus on in this section, which
is more suitable for the enterprise of reverse engineering and articulating additional principles that
make human learning successful. It also opens the possibility of building these ingredients into
the next generation of machine learning and AI algorithms, with potential for making progress on
learning concepts that are both easy and difficult for humans to acquire.
Even with just a few examples, people can learn remarkably rich conceptual models. One indicator
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of richness is the variety of functions that these models support (A. B. Markman & Ross, 2003;
Solomon, Medin, & Lynch, 1999). Beyond classification, concepts support prediction (Murphy
& Ross, 1994; Rips, 1975), action (Barsalou, 1983), communication (A. B. Markman & Makin,
1998), imagination (Jern & Kemp, 2013; Ward, 1994), explanation (Lombrozo, 2009; Williams &
Lombrozo, 2010), and composition (Murphy, 1988; Osherson & Smith, 1981). These abilities are
not independent; rather they hang together and interact (Solomon et al., 1999), coming for free
with the acquisition of the underlying concept. Returning to the previous example of a novel two
wheeled vehicle, a person can sketch a range of new instances (Figure 1B-ii), parse the concept into
its most important components (Figure 1B-iii), or even create a new complex concept through the
combination of familiar concepts (Figure 1B-iv). Likewise, as discussed in the context of Frostbite,
a learner who has acquired the basics of the game could flexibly apply their knowledge to an infinite
set of Frostbite variants (Section 3.2). The acquired knowledge supports reconfiguration to new
tasks and new demands, such as modifying the goals of the game to survive while acquiring as few
points as possible, or to efficiently teach the rules to a friend.
This richness and flexibility suggests that learning as model building is a better metaphor than
learning as pattern recognition. Furthermore, the human capacity for one-shot learning suggests
that these models are built upon rich domain knowledge rather than starting from a blank slate
(Mitchell, Keller, & Kedar-cabelli, 1986). In contrast, much of the recent progress in deep learning
has been on pattern recognition problems, including object recognition, speech recognition, and
(model-free) video game learning, that utilize large data sets and little domain knowledge.
There has been recent work on other types of tasks including learning generative models of images
(Denton, Chintala, Szlam, & Fergus, 2015; Gregor, Danihelka, Graves, Rezende, & Wierstra, 2015),
caption generation (Karpathy & Fei-Fei, 2015; Vinyals, Toshev, Bengio, & Erhan, 2014; K. Xu et al.,
2015), question answering (Sukhbaatar, Szlam, Weston, & Fergus, 2015; Weston, Chopra, & Bordes,
2015), and learning simple algorithms (Graves, Wayne, & Danihelka, 2014; Grefenstette, Hermann,
Suleyman, & Blunsom, 2015); we discuss question answering and learning simple algorithms in
Section 6.1. Yet, at least for image and caption generation, these tasks have been mostly studied
in the big data setting that is at odds with the impressive human ability for generalizing from
small data sets (although see Rezende, Mohamed, Danihelka, Gregor, & Wierstra, 2016, for a deep
learning approach to the Character Challenge). And it has been difficult to learn neural-network-
style representations that effortlessly generalize to new tasks that they were not trained on (see
Davis & Marcus, 2015; Marcus, 1998). What additional ingredients may be needed in order to
rapidly learn more powerful and more general-purpose representations?
A relevant case study is from our own work on the Characters Challenge (Section 3.1; Lake,
2014; Lake, Salakhutdinov, & Tenenbaum, 2015). People and various machine learning approaches
were compared on their ability to learn new handwritten characters from the world’s alphabets.
In addition to evaluating several types of deep learning models, we developed an algorithm using
Bayesian Program Learning (BPL) that represents concepts as simple stochastic programs – that is,
structured procedures that generate new examples of a concept when executed (Figure 5A). These
programs allow the model to express causal knowledge about how the raw data are formed, and
the probabilistic semantics allow the model to handle noise and perform creative tasks. Structure
sharing across concepts is accomplished by the compositional reuse of stochastic primitives that
can combine in new ways to create new concepts.
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relation:!
attached along
relation:!
attached along
relation:!
attached at start
v) exemplars
vi) raw data
iv) object!
template
iii) parts
ii) sub-parts
i) primitives
A B
1 2 1 2
1 21 2
Human or Machine?
Figure 5: A causal, compositional model of handwritten characters. A) New types are generated
compositionally by choosing primitive actions (color coded) from a library (i), combining these sub-
parts (ii) to make parts (iii), and combining parts with relations to define simple programs (iv).
These programs can create different tokens of a concept (v) that are rendered as binary images
(vi). B) Probabilistic inference allows the model to generate new examples from just one example
of a new concept, shown here in a visual Turing Test. An example image of a new concept is shown
above each pair of grids. One grid was generated by 9 people and the other is 9 samples from the
BPL model. Which grid in each pair (A or B) was generated by the machine? Answers by row:
1,2;1,1. Figure reprinted from Lake, Salakhutdinov, and Tenenbaum (2015).
Learning a representation of this form allows the model to perform a challenging one-shot classifica-
tion task at human level performance (Figure 1A-i) and to outperform current deep learning models
such as convolutional networks (Koch, Zemel, & Salakhutdinov, 2015). The representations that
BPL learns also enable it to generalize in other, more creative human-like ways, as evaluated using
“visual Turing tests” (e.g., Figure 5B). These tasks include generating new examples (Figure 1A-ii
and Figure 5B), parsing objects into their essential components (Figure 1A-iii), and generating new
concepts in the style of a particular alphabet (Figure 1A-iv). The following sections discuss the
three main ingredients – compositionality, causality, and learning-to-learn – that were important to
the success of this model and we believe are important to understanding human learning as rapid
model building more broadly. While these ingredients fit naturally within a BPL or a probabilistic
program induction framework, they could also be integrated into deep learning models and other
types of machine learning algorithms, prospects we discuss in more detail below.
4.2.1 Compositionality
Compositionality is the classic idea that new representations can be constructed through the com-
bination of primitive elements. In computer programming, primitive functions can be combined
together to create new functions, and these new functions can be further combined to create even
more complex functions. Productivity is at the core of compositionality: an infinite number of
representations can be constructed from a finite set of primitives, just as the mind can think an
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infinite number of thoughts, utter or understand an infinite number of sentences, or learn new
concepts from a seemingly infinite space of possibilities (Fodor, 1975; Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988).
Compositionality has been broadly influential in both AI and cognitive science, especially as it
pertains to theories of object recognition, conceptual representation, and language. Here we focus
on compositional representations of object concepts for illustration. Structural description models
represent visual concepts as compositions of parts and relations, which provides a strong inductive
bias for constructing models of new concepts (Biederman, 1987; Hummel & Biederman, 1992;
Marr & Nishihara, 1978; Winston, 1975). For instance, the novel two-wheeled vehicle in Figure
1B might be represented as two wheels connected by a platform, which provides the base for a
post, which holds the handlebars, etc. Parts can themselves be composed of sub-parts, forming a
“partonomy” of part-whole relationships that can be used to construct conceptual representations
(Tversky & Hemenway, 1984). In the novel vehicle example, the parts and relations can be shared
and reused from existing related concepts, such as cars, scooters, motorcycles, and unicycles. Since
the parts and relations are themselves a product of previous learning, their facilitation of the
construction of new models is also an example of learning-to-learn – another ingredient that is
covered below. While compositionality and learning-to-learn fit naturally together, there are also
forms of compositionality that rely less on previous learning, such as the bottom-up parts-based
representation of Hoffman and Richards (1984).
Learning models of novel handwritten characters can be operationalized in a similar way. Handwrit-
ten characters are inherently compositional, where the parts are pen strokes and relations describe
how these strokes connect to each other. Lake, Salakhutdinov, and Tenenbaum (2015) modeled
these parts using an additional layer of compositionality, where parts are complex movements cre-
ated from simpler sub-part movements. New characters can be constructed by combining parts,
sub-parts, and relations in novel ways (Figure 5). Compositionality is also central to the construc-
tion of other types of symbolic concepts beyond characters, where new spoken words can be created
through a novel combination of phonemes or a new gesture or dance move can be created through
a combination of more primitive body movements.
An efficient representation for Frostbite should be similarly compositional and productive. A scene
from the game is a composition of various object types, including birds, fish, ice floes, igloos,
etc. (Figure 2). Representing this compositional structure explicitly is both more economical and
better for generalization. Many repetitions of the same objects are present at different locations
in the scene, and thus representing each as an identical instance of the same object with the
same properties is important for efficient representation and quick learning of the game. Further,
new levels may contain different numbers and combinations of objects, where a compositional
representation of objects – using intuitive physics and intuitive psychology as glue – would aid in
making these crucial generalizations (Figure 2D).
Deep neural networks have at least a limited notion of compositionality. Networks trained for object
recognition encode part-like features in their deeper layers (Zeiler & Fergus, 2014), whereby the
presentation of new types of objects can activate novel combinations of feature detectors. Similarly,
a DQN trained to play Frostbite may learn to represent multiple replications of the same object
with some of the same features, facilitated by the invariance properties of a convolutional neural
network architecture. Finally, exciting recent work has shown how neural networks can be used
for efficient inference in more structured generative models (both neural networks and 3D scene
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an airplane is parked on the 
tarmac at an airport
a man riding a 
motorcycle on a beach
a group of people standing on 
top of a beach
Figure 6: Describing scenes without causality: Image captions generated by a deep neural network
(Karpathy & Fei-Fei, 2015) using code from github.com/karpathy/neuraltalk2. Image credits:
TVBS Taiwan/AFP/Getty Images (middle) and Associated Press (right). Similar examples using
images from Reuters news can be found at twitter.com/interesting jpg.
models) that explicitly represent the number of objects in a scene (S. M. A. Eslami et al., 2016), and
we look forward to seeing these ideas continue to develop. To capture the full extent of the mind’s
compositionality, a model must include explicit representations of objects, identity, and relations –
all while maintaining a notion of “coherence” when understanding novel configurations. Coherence
is related to our next principle, causality, which is discussed in the section that follows.
4.2.2 Causality
Causality is about using knowledge of how real world processes produce perceptual observations.
People understand concepts and scenes by building causal models, and perception without causality
can lead to revealing errors. Consider image captions generated by a deep neural network (Figure
6; Karpathy & Fei-Fei, 2015). In many cases, the network gets the key objects in a scene correct
but misses their causal relationships, describing a scene in a way that no person would. In this
section, we discuss several ways that causality influences human learning and perception, making
it a key ingredient for building more human-like machines.
Causal knowledge has been shown to influence how people learn new concepts, especially through
mechanisms such as essentialism (S. A. Gelman, 2003) and intuitive theories (Murphy & Medin,
1985). Providing a learner with different types of causal knowledge changes how they learn and
generalize, as shown by changing the causal network that underlies the features of objects (Rehder,
2003; Rehder & Hastie, 2001) or the causal prescription for producing new examples of the concept
(see Freyd, 1983, for an example related to the Characters Challenge). To explain the role of
causality in learning, conceptual representations have been likened to intuitive theories or explana-
tions, providing the glue that lets core features stick while other equally applicable features wash
away (Murphy & Medin, 1985). Borrowing examples from Murphy and Medin (1985), the feature
“flammable” is more closely attached to wood than money due to the underlying causal roles of the
concepts, even though the feature is equally applicable to both; these causal roles derive from the
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functions of objects. Causality can also glue some features together by relating them to a deeper
underlying cause, explaining why some features such as “can fly,” “has wings,” and “has feathers”
co-occur across objects while others do not.
Causality has also been influential in theories of perception. “Analysis-by-synthesis” theories of
perception maintain that sensory data can be more richly represented by modeling the process that
generated it (Bever & Poeppel, 2010; Eden, 1962; Halle & Stevens, 1962; Neisser, 1966). Relating
data to its causal source provides strong priors for perception and learning, as well as a richer
basis for generalizing in new ways and to new tasks. The canonical examples of this approach are
speech and visual perception. For instance, Liberman, Cooper, Shankweiler, and Studdert-Kennedy
(1967) argued that the richness of speech perception is best explained by inverting the production
plan, at the level of vocal tract movements, in order to explain the large amounts of acoustic
variability and the blending of cues across adjacent phonemes. However, causality does not have
to be a literal inversion of the actual generative mechanisms, as proposed in the motor theory of
speech. For the Bayesian Program Learning model of learning handwritten characters, causality is
operationalized by treating concepts as motor programs – that is, abstract causal descriptions of how
to produce examples of the concept, rather than concrete configurations of specific muscles (Figure
5A). Causality is an important factor in the model’s success in classifying and generating new
examples after seeing just a single example of a new concept (Lake, Salakhutdinov, & Tenenbaum,
2015) (Figure 5B).
Not all causal processes present tractable learning problems, and in most cases it is crucial to find
the right level of causal description. It seems implausible that the mind or a machine should try to
represent the concept of a “tree” in terms of a complete description of biological growth, beginning
with the shared DNA ancestry of all trees, explaining how DNA produces actual trees, and ending
with a generative model that can produce all possible trees. However, if causality is incorporated
at the right level of abstraction, the essence of a tree could be captured by a simple stochastic
program that starts with one branch and then recursively splits.
There have been steps towards deep neural networks that learn causal models of handwritten
characters. Graves (2014) learned a generative model of cursive handwriting using a recurrent neural
network trained on handwriting data. While it synthesizes impressive examples of handwriting in
various styles, it requires a large training corpus and has not been applied to other tasks. The
DRAW network performs both recognition and generation of handwritten digits using recurrent
neural networks with an attentional window, producing a limited circular area of the image at
each time step (Gregor et al., 2015). A more recent variant of DRAW was applied to generating
examples of a novel character from just a single training example (Rezende et al., 2016). While
the model demonstrates an impressive ability to make plausible generalizations that go beyond the
training examples, it generalizes too broadly in other cases, in ways that are not especially human-
like. It is not clear that it could yet pass any of the “visual Turing tests” in Lake, Salakhutdinov,
and Tenenbaum (2015) (Figure 5B), although we hope DRAW-style networks will continue to be
extended and enriched, and could be made to pass these tests. Incorporating causality may greatly
improve these models; they were trained without access to causal data about how characters are
actually produced, and without any incentive to learn the true causal process. An attentional
window is only a crude approximation to the true causal process of drawing with a pen, and in
Rezende et al. (2016) the attentional window is not pen-like at all, although a more accurate pen
model could be incorporated. We anticipate that these sequential generative neural networks could
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make sharper one-shot inferences – with the goal of tackling the full Characters Challenge – by
incorporating additional causal, compositional, and hierarchical structure (and by continuing to
utilize learning-to-learn, described next), potentially leading to a more computationally efficient
and neurally grounded variant of the BPL model of handwritten characters (Figure 5).
A causal model of Frostbite would have to be more complex, gluing together object representations
and explaining their interactions with intuitive physics and intuitive psychology, much like the game
engine that generates the game dynamics and ultimately the frames of pixel images. Inference is
the process of inverting this causal generative model, explaining the raw pixels as objects and
their interactions, such as the agent stepping on an ice flow to deactivate it or a crab pushing the
agent into the water (Figure 2). Deep neural networks could play a role in two ways: serving as
a bottom-up proposer to make probabilistic inference more tractable in a structured generative
model (Kulkarni, Kohli, Tenenbaum, & Mansinghka, 2015) or by serving as the causal generative
model if imbued with the right set of ingredients.
4.2.3 Learning-to-learn
When humans or machines make inferences that go far beyond the data, strong prior knowledge (or
inductive biases or constraints) must be making up the difference (Geman et al., 1992; Griffiths,
Chater, Kemp, Perfors, & Tenenbaum, 2010; Tenenbaum, Kemp, Griffiths, & Goodman, 2011).
One way people acquire this prior knowledge is through “learning-to-learn,” a term introduced by
Harlow (1949) and closely related to the machine learning notions of “transfer learning”, “multi-
task learning” or “representation learning.” These terms refer to ways that learning a new task
can be accelerated through previous or parallel learning of other related tasks. The strong priors,
constraints, or inductive bias needed to learn a certain task quickly are often shared to some extent
with other tasks, and a range of mechansims have been developed to adapt the learner’s inductive
bias at the same time as they learn specific tasks, and then apply these inductive biases to new,
related tasks.
In hierarchical Bayesian modeling (A. Gelman, Carlin, Stern, & Rubin, 2004), a general prior on
concepts is shared by multiple specific concepts, and the prior itself is learned over the course of
learning the specific concepts (Salakhutdinov, Tenenbaum, & Torralba, 2012, 2013). These models
have been used to explain the dynamics of human learning-to-learn in many areas of cognition,
including word learning, causal learning, and learning intuitive theories of physical and social
domains (Tenenbaum et al., 2011). In machine vision, for deep convolutional networks or other
discriminative methods that form the core of recent recognition systems, learning-to-learn can occur
through the sharing of features between the models learned for old objects (or old tasks) and the
models learned for new objects (or new tasks) (Anselmi et al., 2016; Baxter, 2000; Bottou, 2014;
Lopez-Oaz, Bottou, Scholko¨pf, & Vapnik, 2016; Salakhutdinov, Torralba, & Tenenbaum, 2011;
Srivastava & Salakhutdinov, 2013; Torralba, Murphy, & Freeman, 2007; Zeiler & Fergus, 2014).
While transfer learning and multi-task learning are already important themes across AI, and in
deep learning in particular, they have not yet led to systems that learn new tasks as rapidly and
flexibly as humans do. Capturing more human-like learning-to-learn dynamics in deep networks
and other machine learning approaches could facilitate much stronger transfer to new tasks and
new problems. To gain the full benefit that humans get from learning-to-learn, however, AI systems
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might first need to adopt the more compositional and causal forms of representations that we have
argued for above.
We can see this potential in both of our Challenge problems. In the Characters Challenge as
presented in Lake, Salakhutdinov, and Tenenbaum (2015), all viable models use “pre-training”
on many character concepts in a background set of alphabets to tune the representations they
use to learn new character concepts in a test set of alphabets. But to perform well, current
neural network approaches require much more pre-training than do people or our Bayesian program
learning approach, and they are still far from solving the Characters Challenge.6 We cannot be sure
how people get to the knowledge they have in this domain, but we do understand how this works in
BPL, and we think people might be similar. BPL transfers readily to new concepts because it learns
about object parts, sub-parts, and relations, capturing learning about what each concept is like and
what concepts are like in general. It is crucial that learning-to-learn occurs at multiple levels of the
hierarchical generative process. Previously learned primitive actions and larger generative pieces
can be re-used and re-combined to define new generative models for new characters (Figure 5A).
Further transfer occurs by learning about the typical levels of variability within a typical generative
model; this provides knowledge about how far and in what ways to generalize when we have seen
only one example of a new character, which on its own could not possibly carry any information
about variance.
Analogous learning-to-learn occurs for humans in learning many new object models, in vision and
cognition: Consider the novel two-wheeled vehicle in Figure 1B, where learning-to-learn can operate
through the transfer of previously learned parts and relations (sub-concepts such as wheels, motors,
handle bars, attached, powered by, etc.) that reconfigure compositionally to create a model of the
new concept. If deep neural networks could adopt similarly compositional, hierarchical, and causal
representations, we expect they might benefit more from learning-to-learn.
We can see the same interdependence between learning-to-learn and learning with the right rep-
resentations at work in video games, such as our Frostbite Challenge. For human players new to
Frostbite, learning-to-learn plays an essential role in how quickly and accurately they can make
inferences about the structure of the game. People transfer knowledge at multiple levels, from low-
level perception to high-level strategy, exploiting compositionality at all levels. Most basically, they
can transfer what they have learned in playing other video games because they immediately parse
the game environment into objects, types of objects, and causal relations between them. They
understand they are playing a game with goals that can be achieved by exploiting these objects
and causes. Even a young child learning Frostbite can hypothesize right from the start that the
6Humans typically have direct experience with only one or a few alphabets, and even with related drawing
experience, this likely amounts to the equivalent of a few hundred character-like visual concepts at most. For BPL,
pre-training with characters in only five alphabets (spanning 20 examples each for around 150 character types in
total) is sufficient to perform human-level one-shot classification and generation of new examples. The best neural
network classifiers (deep convolutional networks) have error rates approximately five times higher than humans when
pre-trained with five alphabets (25% versus 5% error), and two to three times higher when pre-training on six times
as much data (30 alphabets) (Lake, Salakhutdinov, & Tenenbaum, 2015). The current need for extensive pre-training
is illustrated for deep generative models by Rezende et al. (2016), who present extensions of the DRAW architecture
capable of one-shot learning. BPL could also benefit from deeper forms of learning-to-learn than it currently does:
Some of the important structure it exploits to generalize well is built in to the prior and not learned from the
background pre-training, whereas people might learn this knowledge, and ultimately a human-like machine learning
system should as well.
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birds or the fish might be good things to avoid or to contact, costing or gaining them points or a
life, because in other video games similar types of objects yield similar costs and rewards. When
the polar bear first appears during the more advanced levels (Figure 2D), it is likely better to
avoid the bear than to approach it, given that most of the previously observed animals in the game
are harmful and bears have a particularly ferocious reputation. On some levels, the ice floes are
spaced far apart horizontally, making travel between them impossible (Figure 2A-C). But on other
levels, the ice floes are smaller and spaced closer together, allowing the agent to skip between ice
floes horizontally (Figure 2D). General world knowledge and learning from previous video games
helps to inform this type of exploration and generalization, allowing a single success or mistake to
immediately produce broad generalizations that help the learner understand the game and how to
maximize performance.
Deep reinforcement learning systems for playing Atari games have had some impressive successes
in transfer learning, but they still have not come close to learning to play new games as quickly as
humans can. For example, Parisotto et al. (2016) presents the “Actor-mimic” algorithm that first
learns 13 Atari games by watching an expert network play and trying to mimic the expert netwrk
action selection and/or internal states (for about four million frames of experience each, or 18.5
hours per game). This algorithm can then learn new games faster than randomly initialized DQN:
Scores that might have taken four or five million frames of learning to reach might now be reached
after one or two million frames of practice. But anecdotally we find that humans can still reach
these scores with a few minutes of practice, requiring far less experience than the DQNs. If deep
learning systems could approach video games trying to learn the same kinds of knowledge that
people do – compositionally structured causal models, built on a foundation of intuitive physics
and psychology – they might also be able to transfer knowledge across games as efficiently as people
do, and thereby learn new games much more quickly.
In sum, to produce machines that learn like humans and as fast as humans do, we might also have to
build machines that learn what humans learn. We believe that adopting more compositional, causal
forms of knowledge representation helps both humans and machines get the most from learning-to-
learn. We want to emphasize more generally that we believe all of the core ingredients for learning
rich models articulated in this section – compositionality, causality, and learning-to-learn – can be
incorporated into deep learning systems, and that these ideas will only benefit from being integrated
together. Each one on its own is valuable, but their synergies are even more valuable for building
truly human-like machine learning systems.
4.3 Thinking Fast
The previous section focused on learning rich models from sparse data and proposed ingredients for
achieving these human-like learning abilities. These cognitive abilities are even more striking when
considering the speed of perception and thought – the amount of time required to understand a
scene, think a thought, or choose an action. In general, richer and more structured models require
more complex (and slower) inference algorithms – similar to how complex models require more data
– making the speed of perception and thought all the more remarkable.
The combination of rich models with efficient inference suggests another way psychology and neu-
roscience may usefully inform AI. It also suggests an additional way to build on the successes of
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deep learning, where efficient inference and scalable learning are important strengths of the ap-
proach. This section discusses possible paths towards resolving the conflict between fast inference
and structured representations, including Helmholtz-machine-style approximate inference in gener-
ative models (Dayan, Hinton, Neal, & Zemel, 1995; Hinton et al., 1995) and cooperation between
model-free and model-based reinforcement learning systems.
4.3.1 Approximate inference in structured models
Hierarchical Bayesian models operating over probabilistic programs (Goodman et al., 2008; Lake,
Salakhutdinov, & Tenenbaum, 2015; Tenenbaum et al., 2011) are equipped to deal with theory-
like structures and rich causal representations of the world, yet there are formidable algorithmic
challenges for efficient inference. Computing a probability distribution over an entire space of
programs is usually intractable, and often even finding a single high-probability program poses an
intractable search problem. In contrast, while representing intuitive theories and structured causal
models is less natural in deep neural networks, recent progress has demonstrated the remarkable
effectiveness of gradient-based learning in high-dimensional parameter spaces. A complete account
of learning and inference must explain how the brain does so much with limited computational
resources (Gershman, Horvitz, & Tenenbaum, 2015; Vul, Goodman, Griffiths, & Tenenbaum, 2014).
Popular algorithms for approximate inference in probabilistic machine learning have been proposed
as psychological models (see Griffiths, Vul, & Sanborn, 2012, for a review). Most prominently, it
has been proposed that humans can approximate Bayesian inference using Monte Carlo methods,
which stochastically sample the space of possible hypotheses and evaluate these samples according
to their consistency with the data and prior knowledge (Bonawitz, Denison, Griffiths, & Gopnik,
2014; Gershman, Vul, & Tenenbaum, 2012; T. D. Ullman, Goodman, & Tenenbaum, 2012; Vul et
al., 2014). Monte Carlo sampling has been invoked to explain behavioral phenomena ranging from
children’s response variability (Bonawitz et al., 2014) to garden-path effects in sentence processing
(Levy, Reali, & Griffiths, 2009) and perceptual multistability (Gershman et al., 2012; Moreno-Bote,
Knill, & Pouget, 2011). Moreover, we are beginning to understand how such methods could be
implemented in neural circuits (Buesing, Bill, Nessler, & Maass, 2011; Huang & Rao, 2014; Pecevski,
Buesing, & Maass, 2011).
While Monte Carlo methods are powerful and come with asymptotic guarantees, it is challenging
to make them work on complex problems like program induction and theory learning. When
the hypothesis space is vast and only a few hypotheses are consistent with the data, how can
good models be discovered without exhaustive search? In at least some domains, people may not
have an especially clever solution to this problem, instead grappling with the full combinatorial
complexity of theory learning (T. D. Ullman et al., 2012). Discovering new theories can be slow
and arduous, as testified by the long timescale of cognitive development, and learning in a saltatory
fashion (rather than through gradual adaptation) is characteristic of aspects of human intelligence,
including discovery and insight during development (L. Schulz, 2012), problem-solving (Sternberg
& Davidson, 1995), and epoch-making discoveries in scientific research (Langley, Bradshaw, Simon,
& Zytkow, 1987). Discovering new theories can also happen much more quickly – A person learning
the rules of Frostbite will probably undergo a loosely ordered sequence of “Aha!” moments: they
will learn that jumping on ice floes causes them to change color, changing the color of ice floes
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causes an igloo to be constructed piece-by-piece, that birds make you lose points, that fish make
you gain points, that you can change the direction of ice flow at the cost of one igloo piece, and so
on. These little fragments of a “Frostbite theory” are assembled to form a causal understanding of
the game relatively quickly, in what seems more like a guided process than arbitrary proposals in
a Monte Carlo inference scheme. Similarly, as described in the Characters Challenge, people can
quickly infer motor programs to draw a new character in a similarly guided processes.
For domains where program or theory learning happens quickly, it is possible that people employ
inductive biases not only to evaluate hypotheses, but also to guide hypothesis selection. L. Schulz
(2012) has suggested that abstract structural properties of problems contain information about the
abstract forms of their solutions. Even without knowing the answer to the question “Where is
the deepest point in the Pacific Ocean?” one still knows that the answer must be a location on a
map. The answer “20 inches” to the question “What year was Lincoln born?” can be invalidated
a priori, even without knowing the correct answer. In recent experiments, Tsividis, Tenenbaum,
and Schulz (2015) found that children can use high-level abstract features of a domain to guide
hypothesis selection, by reasoning about distributional properties like the ratio of seeds to flowers,
and dynamical properties like periodic or monotonic relationships between causes and effects (see
also Magid, Sheskin, & Schulz, 2015).
How might efficient mappings from questions to a plausible subset of answers be learned? Recent
work in AI spanning both deep learning and graphical models has attempted to tackle this chal-
lenge by “amortizing” probabilistic inference computations into an efficient feed-forward mapping
(S. A. Eslami, Tarlow, Kohli, & Winn, 2014; Heess, Tarlow, & Winn, 2013; A. Mnih & Gregor,
2014; Stuhlmu¨ller, Taylor, & Goodman, 2013). We can also think of this as “learning to do infer-
ence,” which is independent from the ideas of learning as model building discussed in the previous
section. These feed-forward mappings can be learned in various ways, for example, using paired
generative/recognition networks (Dayan et al., 1995; Hinton et al., 1995) and variational optimiza-
tion (Gregor et al., 2015; A. Mnih & Gregor, 2014; Rezende, Mohamed, & Wierstra, 2014) or
nearest-neighbor density estimation (Kulkarni, Kohli, et al., 2015; Stuhlmu¨ller et al., 2013). One
implication of amortization is that solutions to different problems will become correlated due to
the sharing of amortized computations; some evidence for inferential correlations in humans was
reported by Gershman and Goodman (2014). This trend is an avenue of potential integration of
deep learning models with probabilistic models and probabilistic programming: training neural
networks to help perform probabilistic inference in a generative model or a probabilistic program
(S. M. A. Eslami et al., 2016; Kulkarni, Whitney, Kohli, & Tenenbaum, 2015; Yildirim, Kulkarni,
Freiwald, & Te, 2015). Another avenue for potential integration is through differentiable program-
ming (Dalrmple, 2016) – by ensuring that the program-like hypotheses are differentiable and thus
learnable via gradient descent – a possibility discussed in the concluding section.
4.3.2 Model-based and model-free reinforcement learning
The DQN introduced by V. Mnih et al. (2015) used a simple form of model-free reinforcement
learning in a deep neural network that allows for fast selection of actions. There is indeed sub-
stantial evidence that the brain uses similar model-free learning algorithms in simple associative
learning or discrimination learning tasks (see Niv, 2009, for a review). In particular, the phasic
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firing of midbrain dopaminergic neurons is qualitatively (Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997) and
quantitatively (Bayer & Glimcher, 2005) consistent with the reward prediction error that drives
updating of model-free value estimates.
Model-free learning is not, however, the whole story. Considerable evidence suggests that the
brain also has a model-based learning system, responsible for building a “cognitive map” of the
environment and using it to plan action sequences for more complex tasks (Daw, Niv, & Dayan,
2005; Dolan & Dayan, 2013). Model-based planning is an essential ingredient of human intelligence,
enabling flexible adaptation to new tasks and goals; it is where all of the rich model-building
abilities discussed in the previous sections earn their value as guides to action. As we argued in
our discussion of Frostbite, one can design numerous variants of this simple video game that are
identical except for the reward function – that is, governed by an identical environment model
of state-action-dependent transitions. We conjecture that a competent Frostbite player can easily
shift behavior appropriately, with little or no additional learning, and it is hard to imagine a way
of doing that other than having a model-based planning approach in which the environment model
can be modularly combined with arbitrary new reward functions and then deployed immediately for
planning. One boundary condition on this flexibility is the fact that the skills become “habitized”
with routine application, possibly reflecting a shift from model-based to model-free control. This
shift may arise from a rational arbitration between learning systems to balance the trade-off between
flexibility and speed (Daw et al., 2005; Keramati, Dezfouli, & Piray, 2011).
Similarly to how probabilistic computations can be amortized for efficiency (see previous section),
plans can be amortized into cached values by allowing the model-based system to simulate training
data for the model-free system (Sutton, 1990). This process might occur oﬄine (e.g., in dreaming
or quiet wakefulness), suggesting a form of consolidation in reinforcement learning (Gershman,
Markman, & Otto, 2014). Consistent with the idea of cooperation between learning systems, a
recent experiment demonstrated that model-based behavior becomes automatic over the course of
training (Economides, Kurth-Nelson, Lu¨bbert, Guitart-Masip, & Dolan, 2015). Thus, a marriage
of flexibility and efficiency might be achievable if we use the human reinforcement learning systems
as guidance.
5 Responses to common questions
In discussing the arguments in this paper with colleagues, three lines of questioning or critiques
have come up frequently. We think it is helpful to address these points directly, to maximize the
potential for moving forward together.
1. Comparing the learning speeds of humans and neural networks on specific tasks is
not meaningful, because humans have extensive prior experience.
It may seem unfair to compare neural networks and humans on the amount of training experience
required to perform a task, such as learning to play new Atari games or learning new handwritten
characters, when humans have had extensive prior experience that these networks have not benefited
from. People have had many hours playing other games, and experience reading or writing many
other handwritten characters, not to mention experience in a variety of more loosely related tasks.
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If neural networks were “pre-trained” on the same experience, the argument goes, then they might
generalize similarly to humans when exposed to novel tasks.
This has been the rationale behind multi-task learning or transfer learning, a strategy with a long
history that has shown some promising results recently with deep networks (e.g., Donahue et al.,
2013; Luong, Le, Sutskever, Vinyals, & Kaiser, 2015; Parisotto et al., 2016). Furthermore, some
deep learning advocates argue, the human brain effectively benefits from even more experience
through evolution. If deep learning researchers see themselves as trying to capture the equivalent
of humans’ collective evolutionary experience, this would be equivalent to a truly immense “pre-
training” phase.
We agree that humans have a much richer starting point than neural networks when learning
most new tasks, including learning a new concept or to play a new video game. That is the
point of the “developmental start-up software” and other building blocks that we argued are key
to creating this richer starting point. We are less committed to a particular story regarding the
origins of the ingredients, including the relative roles of genetically programmed and experience-
driven developmental mechanisms in building these components in early infancy. Either way, we
see them as fundamental building blocks for facilitating rapid learning from sparse data.
Learning-to-learn across multiple tasks is conceivably one route to acquiring these ingredients,
but simply training conventional neural networks on many related tasks may not be sufficient to
generalize in human-like ways for novel tasks. As we argued in Section 4.2.3, successful learning-
to-learn – or at least, human-level transfer learning – is enabled by having models with the right
representational structure, including the other building blocks discussed in this paper. Learning-
to-learn is a powerful ingredient, but it can be more powerful when operating over compositional
representations that capture the underlying causal structure of the environment, while also building
on the intuitive physics and psychology.
Finally, we recognize that some researchers still hold out hope that if only they can just get big
enough training datasets, sufficiently rich tasks, and enough computing power – far beyond what
has been tried out so far – then deep learning methods might be sufficient to learn representations
equivalent to what evolution has provided humans with. We can sympathize with that hope and
believe it deserves further exploration, although we are not sure it is a realistic one. We under-
stand in principle how evolution could build a brain with the cognitive ingredients we discuss here.
Stochastic hill-climbing is slow – it may require massively parallel exploration, over millions of
years with innumerable dead-ends – but it can build complex structures with complex functions if
we are willing to wait long enough. In contrast, trying to build these representations from scratch
using backpropagation, deep Q-learning or any stochastic gradient-descent weight update rule in a
fixed network architecture may be unfeasible regardless of how much training data is available. To
build these representations from scratch might require exploring fundamental structural variations
in the network’s architecture, which gradient-based learning in weight space is not prepared to do.
Although deep learning researchers do explore many such architectural variations, and have been
devising increasingly clever and powerful ones recently, it is the researchers who are driving and
directing this process. Exploration and creative innovation in the space of network architectures
have not yet been made algorithmic. Perhaps they could, using genetic programming methods
(Koza, 1992) or other structure-search algorithms Yamins et al. (2014). We think this would be a
fascinating and promising direction to explore, but we may have to acquire more patience than ma-
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chine learning researchers typically express with their algorithms: the dynamics of structure-search
may look much more like the slow random hill-climbing of evolution than the smooth, methodical
progress of stochastic gradient-descent. An alternative strategy is to build in appropriate infant-
like knowledge representations and core ingredients as the starting point for our learning-based AI
systems, or to build learning systems with strong inductive biases that guide them in this direction.
Regardless of which way an AI developer chooses to go, our main points are orthogonal to this
objection. There are a set of core cognitive ingredients for human-like learning and thought.
Deep learning models could incorporate these ingredients through some combination of additional
structure and perhaps additional learning mechanisms, but for the most part have yet to do so.
Any approach to human-like AI, whether based on deep learning or not, is likely to gain from doing
so.
2. Biological plausibility suggests theories of intelligence should start with neural
networks.
We have focused on how cognitive science can motivate and guide efforts to engineer human-like AI,
in contrast to some advocates of deep neural networks who cite neuroscience for inspiration. Our
approach is guided by a pragmatic view that the clearest path to a computational formalization of
human intelligence comes from understanding the “software” before the “hardware.” In the case
of this article, we proposed key ingredients of this software in previous sections.
Nonetheless, a cognitive approach to intelligence should not ignore what we know about the brain.
Neuroscience can provide valuable inspirations for both cognitive models and AI researchers: the
centrality of neural networks and model-free reinforcement learning in our proposals for “Thinking
fast” (Section 4.3) are prime exemplars. Neuroscience can also in principle impose constraints
on cognitive accounts. If deep learning embodies brain-like computational mechanisms and those
mechanisms are incompatible with some cognitive theory, then this is an argument against that
cognitive theory and in favor of deep learning. Unfortunately, what we “know” about the brain
is not all that clear-cut. Many seemingly well-accepted ideas regarding neural computation are in
fact biologically dubious, or uncertain at best – and thus should not disqualify cognitive ingredients
that pose challenges for implementation within that approach.
For example, most neural networks use some form of gradient-based (e.g., backpropagation) or
Hebbian learning. It has long been argued, however, that backpropagation is not biologically plau-
sible; as Crick (1989) famously pointed out, backpropagation seems to require that information be
transmitted backwards along the axon, which does not fit with realistic models of neuronal func-
tion (although recent models circumvent this problem in various ways Liao, Leibo, & Poggio, 2015;
Lillicrap, Cownden, Tweed, & Akerman, 2014; Scellier & Bengio, 2016). This has not prevented
backpropagation being put to good use in connectionist models of cognition or in building deep
neural networks for AI. Neural network researchers must regard it as a very good thing, in this
case, that concerns of biological plausibility did not hold back research on this particular algo-
rithmic approach to learning.7 We strongly agree: Although neuroscientists have not found any
mechanisms for implementing backpropagation in the brain, neither have they produced definitive
evidence against it. The existing data simply offer little constraint either way, and backpropagation
has been of obviously great value in engineering today’s best pattern recognition systems.
7Michael Jordan made this point forcefully in his 2015 speech accepting the Rumelhart Prize.
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Hebbian learning is another case in point. In the form of long-term potentiation (LTP) and spike-
timing dependent plasticity (STDP), Hebbian learning mechanisms are often cited as biologically
supported (Bi & Poo, 2001). However, the cognitive significance of any biologically grounded form
of Hebbian learning is unclear. Gallistel and Matzel (2013) have persuasively argued that the
critical interstimulus interval for LTP is orders of magnitude smaller than the intervals that are
behaviorally relevant in most forms of learning. In fact, experiments that simultaneously manipulate
the interstimulus and intertrial intervals demonstrate that no critical interval exists. Behavior can
persist for weeks or months, whereas LTP decays to baseline over the course of days (Power,
Thompson, Moyer, & Disterhoft, 1997). Learned behavior is rapidly reacquired after extinction
(Bouton, 2004), whereas no such facilitation is observed for LTP (de Jonge & Racine, 1985). Most
relevantly for our focus, it is not clear how Hebbian mechanisms can build the kinds of symbolic
structures needed to implement the ingredients of intelligence this article focuses on.
Claims of biological plausibility or implausibility usually rest on rather stylized assumptions about
the brain that are wrong in many of their details. Understanding which details matter and which do
not requires a computational theory (Marr, 1982). Moreover, in the absence of strong constraints
from neuroscience, we can turn the biological argument around: Perhaps a hypothetical biological
mechanism should be viewed with skepticism if it is cognitively implausible. In the long run, we
are optimistic that neuroscience will eventually place more constraints on theories of intelligence.
For now, we believe cognitive plausibility offers a surer foundation.
3. Language is essential for human intelligence. Why is it not more prominent here?
We have said little in this article about people’s ability to communicate and think in natural
language, a distinctively human cognitive capacity where machine capabilities lag strikingly. Cer-
tainly one could argue that language should be included on any short list of key ingredients in
human intelligence. We ourselves believe that understanding language and its role in intelligence
goes hand-in-hand with understanding the building blocks discussed in this article. But it is also
true that language builds on the core abilities for intuitive physics, intuitive psychology, and rapid
learning with compositional, causal models that we do focus on. These capacities are in place
before children master language, and they provide the building blocks for linguistic meaning and
language acquisition (Carey, 2009; Jackendoff, 2003; Kemp, 2007; O’Donnell, 2015; Pinker, 2007;
F. Xu & Tenenbaum, 2007). We hope that by better understanding these earlier ingredients and
how to implement and integrate them computationally, we will be better positioned to understand
linguistic meaning and acquisition in computational terms, and to explore other ingredients that
make human language possible.
What else might we need to add to these core ingredients to get language? Many researchers have
speculated about key features of human cognition that gives rise to language and other uniquely
human modes of thought: Is it recursion, or some new kind of recursive structure building ability
(Berwick & Chomsky, 2016; Hauser, Chomsky, & Fitch, 2002)? Is it the ability to reuse symbols
by name (Deacon, 1998)? Is it the ability to understand others intentionally and build shared
intentionality (Bloom, 2000; Frank, Goodman, & Tenenbaum, 2009; Tomasello, 2010)? Is it some
new version of these things, or is it just more of the aspects of these capacities that are already
present in infants? These are important questions for future work with the potential to expand the
list of key ingredients; we did not intend our list to be complete.
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Finally, we should keep in mind all the ways that acquiring language extends and enriches the
ingredients of cognition we focus on in this article. The intuitive physics and psychology of infants is
likely limited to reasoning about objects and agents in their immediate spatial and temporal vicinity,
and to their simplest properties and states. But with language, older children become able to reason
about a much wider range of physical and psychological situations (Carey, 2009). Language also
provides much more powerful learning-to-learn abilities, with a compositional representation that
allows children to express new concepts and thoughts in relation to existing concepts much more
flexibly and stably than they previously could (Lupyan & Clark, 2015). Ultimately, the full project
of building machines that learn and think like humans must have language at its core.
6 Looking forward
In the last few decades, AI and machine learning have made remarkable progress: Computer
programs beat chess masters; AI systems beat Jeopardy champions; apps recognize photos of your
friends; machines rival humans on large-scale object recognition; smart phones recognize (and, to a
limited extent, understand) speech. The coming years promise still more exciting AI applications,
in areas as varied as self-driving cars, medicine, genetics, drug design and robotics. As a field,
AI should be proud of these accomplishments, which have helped move research from academic
journals into systems that improve our daily lives.
We should also be mindful of what AI has achieved and what it has not. While the pace of progress
has been impressive, natural intelligence is still by far the best example of intelligence. Machine
performance may rival or exceed human performance on particular tasks, and algorithms may take
inspiration from neuroscience or aspects of psychology, but it does not follow that the algorithm
learns or thinks like a person. This is a higher bar worth reaching for, potentially leading to more
powerful algorithms while also helping unlock the mysteries of the human mind.
When comparing people and the current best algorithms in AI and machine learning, people learn
from less data and generalize in richer and more flexible ways. Even for relatively simple concepts
such as handwritten characters, people need to see just one or a few examples of a new concept
before being able to recognize new examples, generate new examples, and generate new concepts
based on related ones (Figure 1A). So far, these abilities elude the best deep neural networks for
character recognition (Ciresan et al., 2012), which are trained on many examples of each concept
and do not flexibly generalize to new tasks. We suggest that the comparative power and flexibility
of people’s inferences come from the causal and compositional nature of their representations.
We believe that deep learning and other learning paradigms can move closer to human-like learning
and thought if they incorporate psychological ingredients including those outlined in this paper. Be-
fore closing, we discuss some recent trends that we see as some of the most promising developments
in deep learning – trends we hope will continue and lead to more important advances.
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6.1 Promising directions in deep learning
There has been recent interest in integrating psychological ingredients with deep neural net-
works, especially selective attention (Bahdanau, Cho, & Bengio, 2015; V. Mnih, Heess, Graves, &
Kavukcuoglu, 2014; K. Xu et al., 2015), augmented working memory (Graves et al., 2014; Grefen-
stette et al., 2015; Sukhbaatar et al., 2015; Weston et al., 2015), and experience replay (McClelland,
McNaughton, & O’Reilly, 1995; V. Mnih et al., 2015). These ingredients are lower-level than the
key cognitive ingredients discussed in this paper, yet they suggest a promising trend of using in-
sights from cognitive psychology to improve deep learning, one that may be even furthered by
incorporating higher-level cognitive ingredients.
Paralleling the human perceptual apparatus, selective attention forces deep learning models to
process raw perceptual data as a series of high-resolution “foveal glimpses” rather than all at once.
Somewhat surprisingly, the incorporation of attention has led to substantial performance gains in
a variety of domains, including in machine translation (Bahdanau et al., 2015), object recognition
(V. Mnih et al., 2014), and image caption generation (K. Xu et al., 2015). Attention may help these
models in several ways. It helps to coordinate complex (often sequential) outputs by attending to
only specific aspects of the input, allowing the model to focus on smaller sub-tasks rather than
solving an entire problem in one shot. For instance, during caption generation, the attentional
window has been shown to track the objects as they are mentioned in the caption, where the
network may focus on a boy and then a Frisbee when producing a caption like, “A boy throws a
Frisbee” (K. Xu et al., 2015). Attention also allows larger models to be trained without requiring
every model parameter to affect every output or action. In generative neural network models,
attention has been used to concentrate on generating particular regions of the image rather than
the whole image at once (Gregor et al., 2015). This could be a stepping stone towards building
more causal generative models in neural networks, such as a neural version of the Bayesian Program
Learning model that could be applied to tackling the Characters Challenge (Section 3.1).
Researchers are also developing neural networks with “working memories” that augment the shorter-
term memory provided by unit activation and the longer-term memory provided by the connection
weights. These developments are also part of a broader trend towards “differentiable program-
ming,” the incorporation of classic programming data structures into gradient-based learning sys-
tems (Dalrmple, 2016). For example, the Neural Turing Machine is a neural network augmented
with a random access external memory with read and write operations that maintains end-to-end
differentiability (Graves et al., 2014). This model has been trained to perform sequence-to-sequence
prediction tasks such as sequence copying and sorting, which can be seen as a simple form of
program induction from examples, albeit with a description language that is radically different
from traditional programming languages. Similarly, Grefenstette et al. (2015) showed how sim-
ple sequence-to-sequence prediction tasks can be solved using differentiable variants of traditional
computing elements such as stacks and queues. Much larger random-access memories can be im-
plemented using Memory Networks which automatically embed and store each incoming piece of
information in memory, especially useful for question answering tasks and other aspects of language
modeling (Sukhbaatar et al., 2015; Weston et al., 2015).
This new generation of neural networks does not yet meet the challenges introduced in this paper,
but differentiable programming suggests the intriguing possibility of combining the best of program
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induction and deep learning. The types of structured representations and model building ingredients
discussed in this paper – objects, forces, agents, causality, and compositionality – help to explain
important facets of human learning and thinking, yet they also bring challenges for performing
efficient inference (Section 4.3.1). Deep learning systems have not yet shown they can work with
these representations, but they have demonstrated the surprising effectiveness of gradient descent
in large models with high-dimensional parameter spaces. A synthesis of these approaches, able to
perform efficient inference over programs that richly model the causal structure an infant sees in
the world, would be a major step forward for building human-like AI
Another example of combining pattern recognition and model-based search comes from recent AI
research into the game Go. Go is considerably more difficult for AI than chess, and it was only
recently that a computer program – AlphaGo – first beat a world-class player (Chouard, 2016)
by using a combination of deep convolutional neural networks (convnets) and Monte Carlo Tree
search (Silver et al., 2016). Each of these components has made gains against artificial and real
Go players (Gelly & Silver, 2008, 2011; Silver et al., 2016; Tian & Zhu, 2015), and the notion of
combining pattern recognition and model-based search goes back decades in Go and other games.
Showing that these approaches can be integrated to beat a human Go champion is an important AI
accomplishment (see Figure 7). Just as important, however, are the new questions and directions
it opens up for the long-term project of building genuinely human-like AI.
One worthy goal would be to build an AI system that beats a world-class player with the amount
and kind of training human champions receive – rather than overpowering them with Google-scale
computational resources. AlphaGo is initially trained on 28.4 million positions and moves from
160,000 unique games played by human experts; it then improves through reinforcement learning
by playing around a million games a day against itself. By the time it faced world champion Lee
Sedol, AlphaGo had probably played in the neighborhood of hundreds of millions of games, if not
a billion. In contrast, Lee has probably played around 50,000 games in his entire life. Looking at
numbers like these, it is impressive that Lee can even compete with AlphaGo at all. What would it
take to build a professional-level Go AI that learns from only 50,000 games? Perhaps a system that
combines the advances of AlphaGo with some of the complementary ingredients for intelligence we
argue for here would be a route to that end.
AI could also gain much by trying to match the learning speed and flexibility of normal human
Go players. People take a long time to master the game of Go, but as with the Frostbite and
Characters challenges (Sections 3.1 and 3.2), humans can learn the basics of the game quickly
through a combination of explicit instruction, watching others, and experience. Playing just a few
games teaches a human enough to beat someone who has just learned the rules but never played
before. Could AlphaGo model these earliest stages of real human learning curves? Human Go
players can also adapt what they have learned to innumerable game variants. The Wikipedia page
“Go variants” describes versions such as playing on bigger or smaller board sizes (ranging from 9×9
to 38×38, not just the usual 19×19 board), or playing on boards of different shapes and connectivity
structures (rectangles, triangles, hexagons, even a map of the English city Milton Keynes). The
board can be a torus, a mobius strip, a cube or a diamond lattice in three dimensions. Holes can
be cut in the board, in regular or irregular ways. The rules can be adapted to what is known as
First Capture Go (the first player to capture a stone wins), NoGo (the player who avoids capturing
any enemy stones longer wins) or Time Is Money Go (players begin with a fixed amount of time
and at the end of the game, the number of seconds remaining on each player’s clock is added to
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(a)$ (b)$ (c)$
Figure 2: Some special situations in Go. (a) Ko. After black captures white stone by playing at
a, white is prohibited to capture back immediately by playing at b to prevent repetition of game
state. (b) Ko fight. Black captures white at 1, white cannot capture back. Instead, white can plays
at 2, threatening the three black stones (called Ko threat). If black plays at 3 to connect, white
can then win back the Ko. (c) Ladder. Black plays at 1, threatening to capture the white stone at
circle. White escapes but eventually gets captured at the border. Each time after black plays, white’s
liberties shrink from 2 to 1. Images from Sensei’s Library (http://senseis.xmp.net/).
Name Type Description #planes
standard
our/opponent liberties binary true if the group has 1, 2 and   3 liberties 6
Ko (See Fig. 2(a)) binary true if it is a Ko location (illegal move) 1
our/opponent stones/empty binary - 3
our/opponent history real how long our/opponent stone is placed 2
opponent rank binary All true if opponent is at that rank 9
extended
border binary true if at border 1
position mask real exp( .5 ⇤ distance2) to the board center 1
our/opponent territory binary true if the location is closer to us/opponent. 2
Table 1: Features extracted from the current board situation as the input of the network. Note that
extended feature set also includes standard set. As a result, standard set has 21 channels while
extended one has 25 channels.
planes), in particular, free from one step forward simulation. In comparison, Maddison et al. (2015)
uses such features like liberties after the move, captures after the move, etc.
We use a similar way to encode rank in 9 planes as in Maddison et al. (2015). That is, all kyu-players
have all nine planes zero, 1d players has their first plane all-1, 2d players have their second plane
all-1, etc. For 9d and professional players, all the planes are filled with 1.
2.2 NETWORK ARCHITECTURE
Fig. 3 shows the architecture of the network for our best model. We use a 12-layered (d = 12) full
convolutional network. Each convolution layer is followed by a ReLU nonlinearity. Except for the
first layer, all layers use the same width w = 384. No weight sharing is used. We do not use pooling
since they negatively affect the performance. Instead of using two softmax outputs [Maddison et al.
(2015)] to predict black and white moves, we only use one softmax layer to predict the next move,
reducing the number of parameters.
25 feature planes
Conv layer
92 channels
5 × 5 kernel
Conv layers x 10
384 channels
3 × 3 kernel
Conv layer
k maps
3 × 3 kernel
k parallel softmax
x"10"
Our next move (next-1)
Opponent move (next-2)
Our counter move (next-3)
Current board
Figure 3: Our network structure (d = 12, w = 384). The input is the current board situation (with
history information), the output is to predict next k moves.
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Default-policy%
Figure 4: A brief illustration of MCTS with DCNN. (a) A game tree. For each node, the statistics
m/n indicates that from the node, n games are emulated, out of which m are won by black. Root
represents the current game state. (b) A new rollout starting from the root. It picks a move from
the current state using tree policy and advances to the next game state, until it picks the a new
move and expand a new leaf. From the leaf, we run default policy until the game ends (black
wins in the illustration). At the same time, the leaf status is sent to a DCNN server for evaluation.
For synchronized implementation, this new node is available for tree policy after the evaluation is
returned. (c) The statistics along the trajectory of the tree policy is updated accordingly.
situations have been evaluated for a given number of MCTS rollouts. In synchronized implemen-
tation, MCTS will wait until DCNN evaluates the board situation of a leaf node, and then expands
the leaf. Default policy can be executed before or after DCNN evaluation. This is much slower but
guarantees that each node is expanded according to the suggested moves given by DCNN.
In our experiments, we evaluate the synchronized case, which achieves 90% win rate against its raw
DCNN player with only 1000 rollouts. Note that our implementation is not directly comparable to
the asynchronized version in Maddison et al. (2015), achieving 86.7% with 100k rollouts.
3 EXPERIMENTS
3.1 SETUP
We use the public KGS dataset (⇠170k games), which is used in Maddison et al. (2015). We use all
games before 2012 as the training set and 2013-2015 games as the test set. This leads to 144,748
games for training and 26,814 games for testing. We also use GoGoD dataset1 (⇠80k games), which
is also used in Clark & Storkey (2015). 75,172 games are used for training and 2,592 for testing.
For evaluation, our model competes with GnuGo, Pachi [Baudis & Gailly (2012)] and Fuego [En-
zenberger et al. (2010)]. We use GnuGo 3.8 level 10, Pachi 11.99 (Genjo-devel) with the pattern
files, and Fuego 1.1 throughout our experiments.
3.2 MOVE PREDICTION
Table 3 shows the performance comparison for move prediction. For models that predict the next k
moves, we only evaluate their prediction accuracy for the immediate next move.
Maddison et al. (2015) d=12,w=384 d=12,w=512 d=16,w=512 d=17,w=512
55.2 57.1 57.3 56.6 56.4
Table 3: Comparison of Top-1 accuracies for next move predictions using standard features. d is the
depth of the model while w is the number of filters at convolutional layers (except the first layer).
With our training framework, we are able to achieve slightly higher Top-1 prediction accuracy (after
hundreds of epochs) compared to Maddison et al. (2015). Note that using standard or extended
features seem to have marginal gains (Fig. 5). For the remaining experiments, we thus use d = 12
and w = 384, as shown in Fig. 3.
1We used GoGoD 2015 summer version, purchased from http://www.gogod.co.uk. We skip ancient
games and only use game records after 1800 AD.
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(a)	
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Figure 7: An AI system for playing Go, partially combining Deep Convolutional Neural Networks
(DCNN) and model-based search through Monte-Carlo Tree Search (MCTS). (A) The DCNN
system on its own can be used to predict the next k moves given the current board. (B) A search
tree with the current board state as its root. A new MCTS rollout selects moves along the tree
accordi g to t MCTS policy until expanding a new leaf (red circle), which is evaluated by the
DCNN. From the new leaf play proceeds ccording to a pre-defined d f ult policy based on the
Pachi program Baudiˇs nd Gailly (2012), itself based on MCTS. (C) the end-game result of the
new leaf is used to update the search tree. Adapted from Tian and Zhu (2015).
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their score). Players may receive bonuses for creating certain stone patterns or capturing territory
near certain landmarks. There could be four or more players, competing individually or in teams.
In each of these variants, effective play needs to change from the basic game, but a skilled player
can adapt and does not simply have to relearn the game from scratch. Could AlphaGo? While
techniques for handling variable sized inputs in convnets may help for playing on different board
sizes (Sermanet et al., 2014), the value functions and policies that AlphaGo learns seem unlikely to
generalize as flexibly and automatically as people do. Many of the variants described above would
require significant reprogramming and retraining, directed by the smart humans who programmed
AlphaGo, not the system itself. As impressive as AlphaGo is in beating the world’s best players
at the standard game – and it is extremely impressive – the fact that it cannot even conceive of
these variants, let alone adapt to them autonomously, is a sign that it does not understand the
game as humans do. Human players can understand these variants and adapt to them because
they explicitly represent Go as a game, with a goal to beat an adversary who is playing to achieve
the same goal they are, governed by rules about how stones can be placed on a board and how
board positions are scored. Humans represent their strategies as a response to these constraints,
such that if the game changes, they can begin to adjust their strategies accordingly.
In sum, Go presents compelling challenges for AI beyond matching world-class human performance,
in trying to match human levels of understanding and generalization, based on the same kinds and
amounts of data, explicit instructions, and opportunities for social learning afforded to people. In
learning to play Go as quickly and as flexibly as they do, people are drawing on most of the cognitive
ingredients this paper has laid out. They are learning-to-learn with compositional knowledge. They
are using their core intuitive psychology, and aspects of their intuitive physics (spatial and object
representations). And like AlphaGo, they are also integrating model-free pattern recognition with
model-based search. We believe that Go AI systems could be built to do all of these things,
potentially capturing better how humans learn and understand the game. We believe it would
be richly rewarding for AI and cognitive science to pursue this challenge together, and that such
systems could be a compelling testbed for the principles this paper argues for – as well as building
on all of the progress to date that AlphaGo represents.
6.2 Future applications to practical AI problems
In this paper, we suggested some ingredients for building computational models with more human-
like learning and thought. These principles were explained in the context of the Characters and
Frostbite Challenges, with special emphasis on reducing the amount of training data required and
facilitating transfer to novel yet related tasks. We also see ways these ingredients can spur progress
on core AI problems with practical applications. Here we offer some speculative thoughts on these
applications.
1. Scene understanding. Deep learning is moving beyond object recognition and towards scene
understanding, as evidenced by a flurry of recent work focused on generating natural language
captions for images (Karpathy & Fei-Fei, 2015; Vinyals et al., 2014; K. Xu et al., 2015). Yet
current algorithms are still better at recognizing objects than understanding scenes, often
getting the key objects right but their causal relationships wrong (Figure 6). We see com-
positionality, causality, intuitive physics and intuitive psychology as playing an increasingly
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important role in reaching true scene understanding. For example, picture a cluttered garage
workshop with screw drivers and hammers hanging from the wall, wood pieces and tools
stacked precariously on a work desk, and shelving and boxes framing the scene. In order
for an autonomous agent to effectively navigate and perform tasks in this environment, the
agent would need intuitive physics to properly reason about stability and support. A holistic
model of the scene would require the composition of individual object models, glued together
by relations. Finally, causality helps infuse the recognition of existing tools (or the learning
of new ones) with an understanding of their use, helping to connect different object models
in the proper way (e.g., hammering a nail into a wall, or using a saw horse to support a
beam being cut by a saw). If the scene includes people acting or interacting, it will be nearly
impossible to understand their actions without thinking about their thoughts, and especially
their goals and intentions towards the other objects and agents they believe are present.
2. Autonomous agents and intelligent devices. Robots and personal assistants (such as cell-
phones) cannot be pre-trained on all possible concepts they may encounter. Like a child
learning the meaning of new words, an intelligent and adaptive system should be able to
learn new concepts from a small number of examples, as they are encountered naturally
in the environment. Common concept types include new spoken words (names like “Ban
Ki-Moon” or “Kofi Annan”), new gestures (a secret handshake or a “fist bump”), and new
activities, and a human-like system would be able to learn to both recognize and produce
new instances from a small number of examples. Like with handwritten characters, a system
may be able to quickly learn new concepts by constructing them from pre-existing primitive
actions, informed by knowledge of the underlying causal process and learning-to-learn.
3. Autonomous driving. Perfect autonomous driving requires intuitive psychology. Beyond de-
tecting and avoiding pedestrians, autonomous cars could more accurately predict pedestrian
behavior by inferring mental states, including their beliefs (e.g., Do they think it is safe to
cross the street? Are they paying attention?) and desires (e.g., Where do they want to go? Do
they want to cross? Are they retrieving a ball lost in the street?). Similarly, other drivers on
the road have similarly complex mental states underlying their behavior (e.g., Do they want
to change lanes? Pass another car? Are they swerving to avoid a hidden hazard? Are they
distracted?). This type of psychological reasoning, along with other types of model-based
causal and physical reasoning, are likely to be especially valuable in challenging and novel
driving circumstances for which there is little relevant training data (e.g. navigating unusual
construction zones, natural disasters, etc.)
4. Creative design. Creativity is often thought to be a pinnacle of human intelligence: chefs de-
sign new dishes, musicians write new songs, architects design new buildings, and entrepreneurs
start new businesses. While we are still far from developing AI systems that can tackle these
types of tasks, we see compositionality and causality as central to this goal. Many com-
monplace acts of creativity are combinatorial, meaning they are unexpected combinations of
familiar concepts or ideas (Boden, 1998; Ward, 1994). As illustrated in Figure 1-iv, novel
vehicles can be created as a combination of parts from existing vehicles, and similarly novel
characters can be constructed from the parts of stylistically similar characters, or familiar
characters can be re-conceptualized in novel styles (Rehling, 2001). In each case, the free
combination of parts is not enough on its own: While compositionality and learning-to-learn
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can provide the parts for new ideas, causality provides the glue that gives them coherence
and purpose.
6.3 Towards more human-like learning and thinking machines
Since the birth of AI in the 1950s, people have wanted to build machines that learn and think like
people. We hope researchers in AI, machine learning, and cognitive science will accept our challenge
problems as a testbed for progress. Rather than just building systems that recognize handwritten
characters and play Frostbite or Go as the end result of an asymptotic process, we suggest that deep
learning and other computational paradigms should aim to tackle these tasks using as little training
data as people need, and also to evaluate models on a range of human-like generalizations beyond
the one task the model was trained on. We hope that the ingredients outlined in this article will
prove useful for working towards this goal: seeing objects and agents rather than features, building
causal models and not just recognizing patterns, recombining representations without needing to
retrain, and learning-to-learn rather than starting from scratch.
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